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BREAKING ON THROUGH TO THE OTHER SIDE:
UNDERSTANDING CONTINENTAL EUROPEAN
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
ANGEL R. OQUENDO"
1.

INTRODUCTION

European corporate governance has become a hot topic in the
United States.1

Many U.S. academics have been turning their at-

tention to the relatively large role played by financial intermediar-

ies, such as insurance companies and (especially) banks, and by labor directors in Continental European corporations, particularly in
Germany. 2 They have been criticizing the resulting: (1) inadequate
- Professor of Law, University of Connecticut. J.D., Yale University; A.B.,
M.A., Ph.D, Harvard University. The Author would like to thank Eibe Riedel for
his critical comments on an early draft, as well as Gemot Wagner, Anke Mildebrath, and Peter Goldstone for their most helpful research assistance.
German sources have been translated and verified by the Author, and not by
the Universityof PennsylvaniaJournalof InternationalEconomic Lao.
The opinions expressed, as well as any errors, are the Author's.
1 See David Charny, The German Corporate Governance System, 1993 COLuM.
Bus. L. REv. 145 (1998); John C. Coffee, Jr., 7he Future as History. The Prospectsfor
Global Convergence in Corporate Governance and Its Implications, 93 Nw. U. L REV.
641 (1999) [hereinafter Coffee, The Future as History];John C. Coffee, Jr., Do Norms
Matter? A Cross-Country Evaluation, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 2151 (2001) [hereinafter
Coffee, Do Norms Matter?];John C Coffee, Jr., Th7e Rise of Dispersed Ownership:The
Roles of Law and the State in the Separationof Ounershipand Control, 111 YA1u- LJ.1
(2001) [hereinafter Coffee, The Rise of Dispersed Ownersldp]; James A. Fanto, The
Role of Corporate Law in the Adaptation of French Enterprises,1998 COLUMi. Bus. L
REv.97 (1993); Ronald J. Gilson, CorporateGovernanceand Economic Efficiency: lWhen
Do Institutions Matter?, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 327 (1996) [hereinafter Gilson, Corporate
Governance and Economic Efficiency]; Jeffrey N. Gordon, Deutsd Telekom, German
Corporate Governance, and the Transition Costs of Capitalism, 1998 COLUm. Bus. L
REv. 185 (1998) [hereinafter Gordon, Deutsche Telekom]; Jeffrey N. Gordon, Pathways to Corporate Convergence? Two Steps on the Road to Shareholder Capitalism in
Germany 5 CoLUM. J. EuR. L. 219 (1999) [hereinafter Gordon, Patlhways to Corporate
Convergence];Jonathan R. Macey, Italian Corporate Governance. One American's Perspective, 1998 COLuM. Bus. L. REv. 121 (1998); Mark J. Roe, German Codetermination
and German Securities Markets, 1998 CoLUM. Bus. L. REv. 167 (1993) [hereinafter
Roe, German Codetermination].
2 See Michael Adams, Bankennzat und DeutsderJuristentag,37-38 ZIP 1590,
1591 (1996) [hereinafter Adams, Bankenmacht und Deutsdwr Juristentag] ("Ameri-
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internal supervision; (2) insufficient market monitoring; (3) over-

conservative corporate strategy; and (4) deficient capitalization. 3
They have been disagreeing about whether the civil law tradition
will be able to resist the pressure to embrace what they tend to see
as a superior common law approach to corporate organization.
Focusing on Germany, I will comment and qualify these three
critiques. I will argue that addressing them requires transforming,
but not abandoning, the existing legal principles regarding corporations. My guiding idea will be that the continental corporate
governance regime is worth preserving not only as part of a distinct legal culture, 4 but also because it has strengths of its own. The
analysis of its fortes will, incidentally, call to mind certain shortcomings in its U.S. counterpart. The continental model, in contrast
to that of the United States, has the specific capacity to guide corporations in the integration of the interests of their various
stakeholders -such as creditors, employees, and the community.
I will not propose transplanting the "civil law" corporate governance norms, duly reconstructed, to the United States. I am only
suggesting that the continental picture of the corporation might
provide some insight for an internal revision of U.S. corporate law.
Comparative enlightenment and enrichment might thus end up
being a two-way street. Like the civil law, the common law might
be able to reflect upon and re-imagine itself by confronting its
"other".
Beyond this call for more self-reflection, I will take exception to
the inclination in U.S. scholarship to assess corporate governance
cans have examined the Japanese and the German bank-dominated system in reviewing their own corporate monitoring structures."); see also, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Investment Companies as GuardianShareholders:The Place
of the MSIC in the Corporate Governance Debate, 45 STAN. L. REv. 985, 986-88 (1993);
Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Corporate Governance and Commercial

Banking: A Comparative Examination of Germany, Japan, and the United States, 48
STAN. L. REv. 73, 88-89,105 (1995); Mark J. Roe, Some Differences in CorporateStruclures in Germany, Japan and the United States, 102 YALE L.J. 1927, 1946 (1993) [hereinafter Roe, Some Differences in CorporateStructures].
3 See Macey & Miller, supra note 2, at 75; see also Coffee, The Future as History,
supra note 1, at 643; Gilson, Corporate Governance and Economic Efficiency, supra
note 1, at 328; Gordon, Pathways to Corporate Convergence, supra note 1, at 220;
Gordon, Deutsche Telekom, supra note 1, at 186-87; Roe, German Codetermination, supra note 1, at 167.
4 Hopt maintains that codetermination and the universal bank system are
deeply rooted in national tradition, history and culture. Klaus J. Hopt, Gemein-

same Grundsiitze der Corporate Governance in Europa?, ZGR 119, 817 (2000) [hereinafter Hopt, Gemeinsame Grundsitze].
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regimes exclusively in terms of their effect on performance. I will
note that there are other goals, which even U.S. law recognizes,
such as encouraging legal compliance generally or cooperation
among the various players within the corporation. I will also call
into question the predominantly instrumentalist approach to the
company law and point to a reflexive alternative. Moving to such
a standpoint requires regarding the law not only as a means to realize specific ends, but also as a self-standing reality that one may
assess in terms of non-teleological (deontological) principles, such
as justice.
Section 2 of this Article begins by examining some U.S. perspectives on German corporate law. Section 3 will discuss certain
possible reforms within the existing legal parameters. The last part
of this paper, Section 4, will generally assess the critique and contemplate some aspects of the German system that might provide
inspiration for changes in the United States.
2. U.S. PERSPECTIVES OF GERMAN CORPORATE LAW

The recent evolution of U.S. interest in German corporate law
has been quite peculiar. In the late 1960s and throughout the
1970s, U.S. scholars viewed German law as presenting a distinct
and appealing perspective on company law.6 They believed that
this alternative approach was very much worth studying because it
provided valuable insights for reform in the United States on issues such as worker board representation and corporate social responsibility. 7
From the late 1980s into the mid-1990s, the comparative debate
gyrated in a different direction. The central issue became whether
German corporate structure, which allows players with a large
stake (such as banks) to monitor the enterprise, was superior to
5 See Gordon, Pathways to Corporate Convergence?, supra note 1, at 238 ("Seen
from an economic perspective, the goal of a system of corporate governance is to
maximize the economic value of the firm, as measured by the total of economic
returns for all possible residual claimants.").
6 Gilson cautions that US. commentators were interested "in the German
two-tier board system," but otherwise largely ignored corporate governance systems of other nations. Gilson, CorporateGovernanceand Economic Efficiency, supra
note 1, at 331 n.12.
7 See, e.g., Detlev F. Vagts, Reforming the ' Modern" Corporation: Perspctives
from the German, 80 HARV. L. REv. 23 (1966) (describing devices designed to extend
corporate goals and give shareholders, workers, and the public a larger voice in
corporate decisions).
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that of the United States.8 The question that emerged subsequently
was to what extent it made sense to follow the German lead in this
respect.9
Toward the end of the 1990s, there was still another twist in
this discussion. Many jurists, and some economists, 10 embraced
the premise that the German model of concentrated ownership and
compulsory employee participation was inferior." They pondered
whether German law would (or should) ultimately give way to the
U.S. conception of corporate organization.' 2
It is hard to escape the suspicion that relative macroeconomic
performances of the United States and Germany have colored this
debate. In the first period, when neither economy seemed to outpace or to be in competition with the other, the comparative (almost anthropological) standpoint prevailed. During the second
8 Gilson, Corporate Governance and Economic Efficiency, supra note 1, at 332
("Competition appeared to be not just between products but also between governance systems, and, at least for a period, the American system did not seem to
be winning.").
9 See GARY GORTON & FRANK A. SCHMID, UNIVERSAL BANKING AND THE
PERFORMANCE OF GERMAN FIRMS (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. 5453, 1996); Michael E. Porter, Capital Disadvantage:America's Failing Capital
Investment System, 70 HARV. Bus. REv. 65 (Sept-Oct 1992); Alfred F. Conard, The
Supervision of Corporate Management: A Comparison of Developments in European
Community and United States Law, 82 MICH. L. REv. 1459 (1984); Roe, Some Differences in Corporate Structures, supra note 2, at 1990. But cf. JEREMY EDWARDS &

KLAUS FISCHER, BANKS, FINANCE AND INvESTmENT IN GERMANY 22 (1994) (provid-

ing the framework of the German system of investment finance); Roberta Romano, A CautionaryNote on Drawing Lessons from Comparative Corporate Law, 102
YALE L.J. 2021 (1993) (arguing that there is no evidence to support a preference for
German organizational form).
10 Gilson, Corporate Governance and Economic Efficiency, supra note 1, at 327
("The turmoil of the 1980s brought corporate governance out of the shadow of
purely legal analysis. Economists became interested in how corporations make
decisions....').
11 See Charny, supra note 1, at 162 ("Arguably, the German system is faring
much less well in the current, set stage of the postwar readjustment."); Rafael La
Porta et al., Legal Determinantsof External Finance,52 J. FIN. 1131 (1997); Macey &
Miller, supra note 2, at 100; Jonathan R. Macey, Measuring the Effectiveness of Different Corporate Governance Systems: Toward a More Scientific Approach, 10 J. APPUED
CORP. FIN. 16 (1998).
12 See Coffee, The Future as History,supra note 1, at 653; Gordon, Deutsche Telekom, supra note 1, at 197; Gordon, Pathways to Corporate Convergence, supra note 1,
at 238; Roe, German Codetermination,supranote 1, at 181. Cf. Gilson, Corporate Governance and Economic Efficiency, supra note 1, at 342 ("The central challenge to architects seeking to remodel existing corporate governance institutions, or design
new ones, will be how to manage the tradeoff, a balance no existing system has
yet achieved.').
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phase, the globalization process was just taking off. More significantly, the United States was mostly mired by recession while
Germany was booming. At the time, a cautiously emulative spirit
carried the day. During the vertiginously globalized third stage,
the United States shifted into economic high speed, while Germany
stagnated. The general tone of U.S. scholars then became somewhat triumphant Now that the U.S. economy has come to a halt
and its German counterpart is growing at a miserable rate, who
knows what direction this discussion will take?
Of course, U.S. commentators have not been mere cheerleaders.
Their analysis has frequently been sophisticated and insightful.
Yet, they often focus too much on the impact of corporate governance on economic achievement They would lose interest if they
thought that there was no correlation.
Inasmuch as U.S. critics assume a cause-and-effect relationship,
their excitement about the organization of U.S. corporations increases when U.S. macroeconomic achievements are stellar. However, they should bear in mind that company law affects economic
performance in a complex way and in conjunction with many other
factors. 3 Moreover, they should realize that corporate structure
has functions other than increasing output I will return to these
points further into the article.
What aspect of the German approach has mostly caught the eye
of U.S. specialists? Most conspicuously, they have observed that
U.S. corporations have a single board, whereas the directorship in
Germany has two tiers' 4 In the United States, there is a single directorial board, which includes many independent directors, but
whose most active members are usually the managers.' s German
law requires corporations to have two separate councils: one denominated supervisory and the other managerial1 6 The latter is
responsible for the day-to-day operation of the business. The for13 See Gilson, CorporateGovernance and Economic Effidency, supra note 1, at 328
("I want to make clear at the outset that the existence of an important link between corporate governance and corporate performance is not self-evident").
14 See Marcus Lutter, Vergleidende Corporate Governance: Die deutsdce Sidit,
ZGR 224, 226 (2001) ("Our large and listed corporations necessarily live in the
dual system, in the two-tier system of management and supervisory council.')
[hereinafter Lutter, Vergleichende orporateGovenance].

15 See MELVIN ARON
16

(1992)

EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS

AND

OTHER BUSINESS

147 (8th ed. 2000).
See Heinz-Dieter Assmann, in 1 GROIzKO.%ffirAR ZuM AKTIcNGEsETZ 267
[hereinafter Assmann, ArIENTGESETZ].

ORGANIZATIONS,
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mer oversees management, like some U.S. independent directors
do.
This distinction, nonetheless, is essentially formal. To discover
a real contrast, one has to delve deeper. Thus, one discerns the two
key points of divergence that have captured the imagination of
U.S. corporate law academia. The first difference is in the function
of labor in the corporation's administrative structure. The other
distinction is in the role played by large financial institutions in
corporate governance.
First, in public corporations with over two thousand employees, German law assigns half of the supervisory council seats to the
workers under the principle of codetermination.17 The shareholders appoint the remaining members. In case of impasse, the council's chairman, who is a representative of stock, casts the deciding
vote. Incidentally, French law also contemplates employee participation, but only as an optional feature. In contrast, U.S. law is
completely silent on this issue. Proposals for the creation of labor
directors emerge consistently in the United States, 18 but never become positive law.
Second, in Germany-like in France and other countries on the
Western European Continent-many board members respond to
financial entities, such as banks.19 German banks own large blocks

17 Gesetz fiber die Mitbestimmung der Arbeitnehmer (Mitbestimmungsgesetz-MitbestG), v. 4.5 1976 (BGBI.I s.1153); see Lutter, Vergleichende Corporate Governance, supra note 14, at 226-227 ('The supervisory councils of our large public
corporations are all codetermined. The law thoroughly regulates codetermination
and its details."). In smaller corporations, employees get one third of the positions on the council. BetrVG1952. See generally, Hopt, Gemeinsame Grundsi7tze, supra note 4, at 800 (detailing the codetermination duties of different kinds of corporations).
18 See, e.g., Kent Greenfield, The Place of Workers in Corporate Law, 39 B.C. L.
REV. 283, 287 (1998) ("I suggest that workers should have some kind of representation on the board of directors .... .); Marleen A. O'Connor, The Human Capital
Era: Reconceptualizing Corporate Law to Facilitate Labor-Management Cooperation, 78
CORNELL L. REV. 899 (1993) (explaining that corporate law should provide for employee representation on boards).
19 See Ronald J. Gilson, The PoliticalEcology of Takeovers: Thoughts on Harmonizing the European CorporateGovernance Environment,61 FORDHAM L. RE.. 161,177
(1992) ("[Tlhe German model is commonly taken to fix control in management,
subject to ongoing monitoring by large banks.") [hereinafter Gilson, PoliticalEcology]; Gordon, Deutsche Telekom, supra note 1, at 192 ("From an American perspective, the distinctive feature of German corporate governance is the role of leading
German banks, which have representatives on supervisory boards of most large
publicly traded German firms, often as Chair."); Macey & Miller, supra note 2, at
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of stock and vote deposited shares20 as well as shares owned by
bank-operated mutual funds7' U.S. law has traditionally forbid75 (German "banks exert more influence in corporate decisionmaking than in the
United States.'.
20 See Gilson, PoliticalEcology, supra note 19, at 181 (pointing out "the pervasiveness of bearer shares which shift voting power to the depositories in which
they are held, and the barriers to a beneficial owner actually voting bearer shares
lodged with a depository or directing the depository how to vote" in Germany).
21 Marcus Lutter, Macht der Banken, 42 NJV 2766, 2766 (19955) (pointing out
that German banks own important investment firms); sce also Adams, Bankenmadzt
und Deutscher Juristentag,supra note 2, at 1602 ("The five main private banks
dominate

-..

large German firms and thousands of other enterprises through the

right to vote deposited shares, direct ownership, and bank-controlled capital investment firms.); Theodor Baums & Christian Fraune, Insitutionelle Anleger und
Publikumsgesellschaft: Eine empirische Untersuchung, 40 AG 97 (1993) (demonstrating empirically bank domination in shareholder meetings); Gilson & Kraakman,
supra note 2, at 988 ("[Bank] concentration of voting control comes from three
sources: the banks' direct stock holdings, the holdings of mutual funds operated
by the banks, and the proxy votes of bearer shares deposited with banks through
the banks' stock brokerage operations."); Gordon, Deutsdze Telekom, supranote 1,
at 192 (stating that banks have direct holdings, manage mutual funds, and most
significantly exercise "discretionary authority over customers' shares on deposit'; Hopt, Gemeinsame Grundsdtze, supra note 4, at 803 ("The German universal
bank system characteristically allows banks to be in the business of both credit
and investment"; id. at 804 (specifying banks' sources of influence); Claus
K6hler, Referat, in EiPFEHLEN SICH GESETZUCHE REGELUNGEN ZUR EINSCHRANKWNG
DES EINFLUSSES DER KREDITINSTITUTE AUF AI<TENGESELSCHAFrEN? N47, N47- N48

(61. Deutschen Juristentag) (1996) (noting that German banks are creditors, investment fund managers, direct owners of shares, and depots for shares belonging
to others); Lutter, Macht der Banken, supra note 21, at 2766 (describing how universal banks excercise influence in the corporation); Macey & Miller, srranote 2, at
88-89 (describing sources of bank voting power); Peter 0. MiIbert, GuladulenE, in
EiRPFLElN SICH GESETZUCHE REGELUNGEN ZUR EINSCHRANIWNG DES EMIrUSSES
DER KREDmNSnITuTE AUF AKTIENGESELLSMAFIEN? E4, E14-E66 (61. Deutschen Ju-

ristentag) (1996) (detailing banks' three influence mechanisms: direct ownership,
voting rights over deposited shares, and supervisory council seats); Thomas
Raiser, Empfehlen sich gesetzliche Regelungen zur Einschrenlzmig des Einflusscs der
KreditinstituteaufAktiengesellschaften?, 35 NJW 2257,2257 (1996) (noting that banks
exercise influence in the corporation in virtue not only of their credit business, but
also of their direct ownership of shares, control of shares as capital investor, and
appointment of supervisory council members); Roe, Some Differences in Coqrrafe
Structures, supra note 2, at 1930 ("German national banks enter boardrooms by
combining votes from stock they own directly, stock in bank-controlled investment companies, and securities they vote for their brokerage customers."); Uwe
H. Schneider & Ulrich Burgard, Traitsparenz als Instnument der Slttenng des Emflusses der Kreditinstitute auf Aktiengesellsdtaft, 35 DB 1761, 1761 (1996) (C[IThe
potential influence of credit institutions ... rests on three pillars: supervisory
council seats, direct ownership, and the right to vote deposited shares."). Sfe generally § 135 0)(1), AktG. The Appeals Court in Duisseldorf thus noted how, in a
particular case, the Deutsche Bank "was a creditor, an agent for its depositor
shareholders, and a member of the supervisory council Under these circum-
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den this kind of control by credit institutions. 22 Banks may not
possess more than a relatively small percentage of a particular
company's equity and, until very recently, could not act as investment banks, equity mutual funds, or insurers.23 The ownership
pattern is therefore rather diffuse in the United States, whereas in
Germany and throughout continental Europe it is more concentrated. 24
U.S. scholars maintain that these two structural variances lead
to discrepancies or, rather deficiencies, in the way in which German corporations operate. They note that: (1) there is insufficient
oversight by the supervisory council; (2) that the market is unable
to be an effective disciplining force; (3) that corporate strategy is
excessively risk averse; and (4) that the level of venture and other
capital is too low. I will explore these three points separately.
With respect to the first criticism, U.S. commentators argue that
presence of labor has prevented the supervisory council from performing its role adequately. 25 They point out that, without proper
supervision, businesses are unable to function optimally. They
therefore view codetermination as detrimental to efficiency.
However, the contention is not that employee representatives
have either disrupted or dominated meetings with their unreasonable demands. Contrary to what the U.S. debate on worker represtances, a bank must take into account not only its own interests as a creditor, but
also those of the enterprise as well as those of the represented shareholders."
OLG Dfisseldorf, ZIP 1996,1211,1215.
22 Roe, Some Differences in Corporate Structures, supra note 2, at 1930 ("In fact,
several laws bar U.S. banks from involvement in the governance of American

firms.").
23 Id. at 1948 ("American legal restrictions have historically kept American
banks small and weak, by banning them from operating nationally, entering
commerce, affiliating with investment banks, equity mutual funds, or insurers, or
from coordinating stockholdings with these other intermediaries."); see also Hopt,
Gemeinsame Grundsdtze, supra note 4, at 785 (explaining that, despite constant criticism, the separation between credit and investment businesses under the GlassSteagall Act prevailed until 1999); K~hler, supra note 21, at N48 (discussing efforts
in the United States to abolish the Glass-Steagall Act).
24 See Gilson, Political Ecology, supra note 19, at 182 ("The relative importance
of bank financing thus helps explain both the importance of banks in the German
corporate governance environment and the continued concentration of equity
holdings."); Gordon; Pathways to CorporateConvergence?, supranote 1, at 223 (citing
empirical evidence on high German ownership concentration).
25 See Gordon, Pathways to CorporateConvergence?, supranote 1, at 222 ("Many
believe that codeterntination has undermined the potential monitoring capacity of
the German board.").
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sentation might have anticipated, the German labor delegation has
neither paralyzed the council nor exacted excessive concessions to
the employees from corporations.26 German workers have obtained comparatively superior working conditions through a labor
movement that has been extremely effective at collective bargaining and political lobbying, not by dickering within the supervisory
council. Labor representatives in the supervisory council tend to
perform their duties within that body pretty much like shareholder
delegates, perhaps too much so.
What U.S. analysts actually argue is that German managers
have taken as much authority as possible away from the supervisory council in order to avoid potential obstructionism by labor.2
Presumably, management has achieved this objective by colluding
with credit institutions,28 which are also wary of the employee
delegation and which have other ways of holding their ground.
For example, in addition to exerting pressure as creditors, financial
intermediaries may always reassert their authority through the
council if they feel that managers are deviating too far from their
interests.
U.S. commentators certainly realize that other factors further
weaken the supervisory council. They recognize that, because of
conflicting loyalties, the representatives of labor and of debtholders
are not in a position to thoroughly scrutinize management from the
standpoint of shareholder value 2 9 They are also aware that the
delegates of the employees and, especially, those of the credit institutions often sit on the councils of many different companies at

26 See Hopt, Gemeinsame Grundsfitze, supra note 4, at 801 ('The German corporate world seems to have adapted to employee codetermination really well!); s e
also id. at 802.
27 See Charny, supra note 1, at 158 ("As the workers will tend to have interests
directly adverse to those interest of the managers and the shareholders, inside
managers naturally will attempt to avoid decision-making through the board as
much as possible.").
28 See Roe, German Codetermination,supra note 1, at 167-68 ("[Mlanagers and
stockholders sapped the supervisory board of power (or, more accurately, prevented it from evolving into a serious governance institution in the face of the
1980's and 1990's global competition and technological change) to reduce employee influence in the firm.'); see also id. at 169 (remarking that "managers and
shareholders" have weakened "the large firm's supervisory board").
29 Gordon, Deutsche Telekom, supra note 1, at 194 (stating that banks may selfdeal, by using their "influence to increase interest charges and fees at the expense
of equity holders').
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the same time and therefore cannot sufficiently concentrate on any
one of these enterprises. 30
The second objection is that monitoring through the market is
weak on the European Continent. Unfriendly acquisitions take
place less frequently.3 ' Part of the explanation is that it is difficult
to succeed with a tender offer. There usually are not enough scattered stockholders from whom to purchase a controlling share of
the business enterprise. Typically, raiders must ally themselves
with one of the heavyweight owners. 32 Insofar as the big players
team up with each other and with management, hostile takeovers
will practically be out of the question.33
Friendly transactions will then become the only option. Yet,
they are a less effective disciplining mechanism because the purchaser must typically pay a control premium and buy off displaced
managers. 34 Only when the difference between potential and current output is large enough to compensate for these additional expenses will the acquisition and the corresponding efficiency gain

30 See, e.g., id. at 194 (explaining that bank senior officials "serve on or chair
too many supervisory boards to do an effective job .... ).
31 Gilson, Corporate Governance and Economic Efficiency, supra note 1, at 328
("And in both Germany and Japan, capital market monitoring through hostile
takeovers, characteristic of United States stock market-centered goverance [sic], is
virtually absent."); Macey & Miller, supra note 2, at 75-76 (arguing that "Japanese
and German bank-dominated systems of corporate governance actually prevent
the development of robust markets for corporate control in those countries"); Roe,
German Codetermination, supra note 1, at 181 (noting that Germany "lacks takeovers'.
32 Gilson elucidates the argument, explaining that:

"[i]n Germany, it is difficult for control to be accumulated or transferred
through the market because of the combination of: (1) a two-tiered board
system that insulates operating management from prompt displacement;
(2) bearer shares that serve to give the large banks voting power that far
exceeds their not insubstantial direct equity holdings; and (3) limits on
the maximum number of shares a single shareholder can vote."
Gilson, Political Ecology, supra note 19, at 177-78.
33 Adams, Bankenmacht und Deutscher Juristentag, supra note 2, at 1601

("Cross-over intertwining [of the interests of managers and financial intermediaries] shield incumbent management from market monitoring and thus reduce the
value of the enterprise.").
34 See Coffee, The Rise of Dispersed Ownership, supra note 1, at 20 ("In marketcentered economies, the market for corporate control is the ultimate disciplinary
mechanism, and the hostile takeover, its final guillotine.").
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take place.3 5 With codetermination, the bidder may also have to

make concessions to labor representatives regarding layoffs and
working conditions.
The third criticism is that Continental European managers have
to attend too much to the priorities of controlling financial intermediaries. The latter, as debtholders, are supposedly too risk
averse from the standpoint of ordinary shareholders?s as well as
from that of economic efficiency. The point is that these allpowerful financial institutions use their influence behind the corridors to push the corporation towards excessively conservative decision making. The employee delegation is probably also too
averse to risk, inasmuch as its constituents have invested all their
human capital in the company. It will therefore use whatever

weight it has to support for corporate conservatism.
The fourth critique is that financial intermediaries take advan-

tage of minority shareholders within the corporation and, at a
macro level, thwart the emergence of a shareholder culture. 7 They
thus make it more expensive to acquire capital, particularly venture capital, from potential investors.-I The full argument is not
35 See Charny, supra note 1, at 161 ("Here, Anglo-American style regulation to
facilitate takeovers and prevent self-dealing appears necessary if a takeover market is to develop.!).
36 See Charny, supra note 1, at 151 ("Though highly sophisticated, as creditors
[banks] pursue substantially different interests from those of shareholders.");
Gordon, Deutsche Telekom, supra note 1, at 195 ("Creditors and equity holders will
have different attitudes toward risk, since the creditors' claim is capped on the
upside (at full repayment) and the equity holders claim is capped on the downside (by limited liability)."); Gordon, Pathways to Corporate Convergence?, supra
note 1, at 222 ("Because in most cases the bank's interest as creditor (or potential
creditor) dominates its stockholder interest, its monitoring decisions will be conflicting."); Macey & Miller, supranote 2, at 75 (discussing how German banks have
used their influence in corporate decision making "to reduce risktaking among
borrowers").
37 See Gordon, Deutsche Telekom, supra note 1, at 189; Gordon, Patrways to Corporate Convergence, supra note 1, at 220; see also Roe, German Codetermination,supra
note 1, at 168 ("German securities markets do not develop."); id. at 169 ("Standard
accounts identify the lack of an equity-holding culture. ... ).
3s See Coffee, The Future as History, supra note 1, at 671; La Porta et al., supra
note 11, at 1131; Gordon, Deutsche Telekom, supra note 1, at 187; Gordon Pallrnjs
to CorporateConvergence?, supra note 1, at 220 (explaining that "[i]nitial public offerings historically have been rare in Germany-only 10 in all of 1994, and the
stock markets are famously illiquid and volatile," which makes high-tech, venture
capital development difficult); Roe, German Codetennination, supra note 1, at 169
("German businesspeople, the German business press, and business academics at
times point to Germany's lack of a vibrant securities markets [sic] that would take
innovative firms public and help charge-up the German economy.").
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only that bank hegemony curtails the supply of capital funds
through the securities market, but also that codetermination reduces the demand by corporations. 39 The end result is not only a
further reinforcement of the conservative agenda, but also an excessive reliance on debt to finance corporate operations. 40
None of the U.S. critics seriously proposes abolishing codetermination or legally restricting the power of financial intermediaries
as a solution to these four problems. On the one hand, virtually all
of these commentators agree that employee representation in the
supervisory council is an integral part of German political culture
that is not realistically subject to elimination. On the other hand,
they warn against exporting the U.S. restrictions on credit institutions and actually applaud the U.S. process of discarding these
limitations as arbitrary, inefficient, and contrary to the national interest.41 The conclusion is, rather, that German corporations operate at a disadvantage because of these two features and will have
to find ways to make up for this handicap in order to remain competitive internationally.
3.

RECONSTRUCrING GERMAN CORPORATE LAW IMMANENTLY

I would like to examine the four criticisms of German corporate
structure just mentioned. This section will begin with the question
of monitoring-internal and external, respectively. Thereafter, it
will proceed to the allegation of conservatism. Finally, it will entertain the issue of inadequate capitalization.
I will point out in what respects the critique is off the mark. I
will also note the extent to which there is truth to the objections.
Furthermore, my discussion will keep in mind German proposals
and laws that have emerged in response to the existing problems.
39 See Roe, German Codetermination,supra note 1, at 169 ("[Tlhe codetermined
structure fits poorly ... with diffuse ownership."); id. at 178 ("The codetermined
German supervisory board might keep corporate issuers' demand for securities
markets and their supporting apparatus low .... ").
40 Gordon, Deutsche Telekom, supra note 1, at 188 ("Thus, the development of a
shareholding culture carries with it some idea of... shifting the focus of finance
and governance away from creditor claims to equity claims.").
41 Adams, Bankenmacht und Deutscher Juristentag,supra note 2, at 1591 ("Parts
of the Glass-Steagall Act have been recognized as too rigid and there are plans,
which have been partially carried out, to loosen the system separating bank functions, as long as there are no conflicts of interests among the participants.');
Macey & Miller, supra note 2, at 112 (expressing "support proposals to liberalize
the Glass-Steagall Act and the Bank Holding Company Act").
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Finally, I will suggest additional reforms that would not entail sacrificing the distinct character of German and Continental European
corporate governance.

3.1. BolsteringInternalSupervision
Bluntly stated, the first contention is that labor representation
in the supervisory council is unfortunate because it leads managers

and controlling shareholders to conspire to undermine that body.
The argument is that if there were no employee delegation, stockholders would insist on a strong supervisory council and managers
would have to run the corporation more responsibly and effi-

ciently. Of course, the concentration of power in the hands of
credit institutions facilitates the conspiracy.
There indeed seems to be wide consensus -in Germany as well

as in the United States-that the supervisory council does not
scrutinize managers' actions closely enough 42 This inadequacy responds to the way in which the body operates. As Mark Roe
points out, the board is often too large, meets too infrequently, and
does not receive enough information to perform its monitoring role
appropriately 4 3
The supervisory council could, on its own initiative, overcome

all of these operational deficiencies. First, it could carry out signifi42 See MANUEL R. THEISEN, DME OBERWACHUNG DER UrERNE-MEFNSFiHRUNG:
BETRIEBSWIRTSCHAFTiCHE ANsATZE ZUR ENTWIcUNG ERSER GRUN~ S.TZE
(1987) [hereinafter THEISEN,
at 250
UBERWACHUNG,
ORDNUNGSMALIGER

UNTERNE-MENSFOHRUNG]; see Stefan Grundmann & Peter 0. Milbert, Corporate
Governance-Europtoische Perspektiven, ZGR 215, 222 (2000) (noting the German
perception that "the board performs its monitoring function partially inadequately.'.
43 See Roe, German Codetermination, supra note 1, at 163 ("Board meetings are
infrequent, information flow to the board is poor, and the board is often too big
and unvieldy to be effective.); see also EDWARDS & FISCHER, supra note 9, at 12930, 213-14 (suggesting that the supervisory council receives only limited information); Charny, supra note 1, at 152 ("[S]upervisory boards on which bank representatives sit meet infrequently [and] are poorly informed . .. ."); Gordon Pathways to Corporate Convergence?, supra note 1 at 222 ("Supervisory boards are
Also, supervisory boards meet infreunwieldy-commonly twenty seats ....
quently, normally four times a year or less.'); Friedrich Kfibler, Referat, in
EmFEHLEN SICH GESETZUCHE REGELUNGEN ZUR EINSCHRANIUNG DES EINFLUSSES

DER KREDITINSTITUTE AUF AKTIENGESELLSCHAFTEN? N10, N17 (61. Deutschen Juristentag) (1996) (stating that a supervisory council with twenty members "is too
large to carry out its supervisory duties in an appropriate manner"); Lutter, Vergleichende Corporate Governance, supra note 14, at 229 ('There can be no personal
accountability in a body of 20 members.").
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cant deliberation in relatively small committees. 44 Second, it could
gather on a more regular basis. 45 Third, it could demand as much
data as it deemed necessary.
The 1998 Corporate Control and Transparency Act, in fact,
compels the supervisory council to move in this direction. 46 The
47
body must now report on the committees it has set up. It must
meet at least four times a year.48 "Finally, the flow of information
from the managerial to the supervisory board has been once again
improved." 49 Coincidentally, the supervisory council is presently
in a better position to obtain information from the financial and the
business auditors.50
Marcus Lutter mentions other deficiencies in the supervisory
council's operation that the law on corporate control and transparency has fully or partially removed. Some examples are: (1) insufficient participation in the decision making; (2) lack of a compensation system based on performance; (3) unclear standards on
liability and sanctions; (4) inadequate working conditions.5 1 "The
44

See Lutter, Vergleichende Corporate Governance, supra note 14, at 226-227

(explaining that, in order to improve accountability, "individuals must come together in committees and responsibly undertake their controversial tasks"); see
also id., at 230, 232; Peter Hommelhoff, Die OECD -Principles on CorporateGovernance -ihre Chancen und Risiken aus dem Blickwinkel der Deutschen corporate governance-Bewegung, ZGR 238, 256-57 (2001) ("Organizationally, the interaction between
management and supervisory council regarding information and decision making
may be improved considerably with the formation of committees within the supervisory council.").
45 See Roe, German Codeternination,supra note 1, at 170 ("[T]he board is free to
meet more frequently ..... ).
46 Gesetz zur Kontrolle und Transparenz im Unternehmensbereich (KonTraG) [Law on Corporate Control and Transparency], v. 30.04.1998 (BGBI. I S. 786794).
47 § 171 11(2), AktG (listed corporations).
48
110 111, AktG.
49 Lutter, Vergleichende Corporate Governance, supra note 14, at 228 (citing § 90

H(2), AktG).
50 The financial auditor negotiates his or her contract to monitor the corporation with the supervisory council and must participate in the council's final
evaluation session. §§ 111 11(3), 171 1(2), AktG. See, generally, Hopt, Gemeinsame
Grundsfitze, supra note 4, at 795-96 (specifying the duties of the financial auditor).
See also Grundmann & Milbert, supra note 42, at 222 ("The Corporate Control and
Transparency Act has expanded the monitoring duties of financial auditors, "particularly in listed corporations."); Hommelhoff, supra note 44, at 258 ("With the
Corporate Control and Transparency Act, the financial auditor's activities, particularly in support of the supervisory council, have become a characteristic part
of German corporate.").
51 Lutter, Vergleichende CorporateGovernance,supra note 14, at 227-28.
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reforms of the very recent Corporate Control and Transparency
Act," according to Lutter, "have dearly raised the standards of
corporate governance in Germany." 2
However, this significant amendment to German corporate law
does not affect the basic critique. Managers and major shareholders will presumably continue to have an interest in undermining
the supervisory council They will have to comply with the letter
of the law, but they might just stop at that. In fact, Lutter concedes
that the noticeable movement in supervisory councils to "comply
with the new legal provisions in a timely and exact manner," "often enough" is just "a ritual." 3 U.S. commentators might speculate
that management will find ways to subvert the spirit of the new
law.
It is indeed quite possible that managers, with shareholder acquiescence, seek to weaken the supervisory council. Predominant
investors might be willing to play along insofar as they have other
ways of exercising their influence and obtaining information.5 4
Yet, this account seems to be accurate only to some extent. There
are many gaps. A more complete analysis actually leads to a more
tentative conclusion.
Capital would undoubtedly prefer to have the supervisory
council all to itself. Yet, it will most certainly support the body in
its current form because a radical transformation is not a real option. In the end, even major investors will probably favor monitoring by a codetermined board to no formal supervision at all.
One should bear in mind that, in principle, shareholder representatives may always outvote the labor contingent. Whenever
there is a tie, the chairman, appointed by capital, casts a second
vote.55 Consequently, investors as a group have ultimate control

12

IL at 228.

53 Id. at 228-29.

54 "[Blank members [of the supervisory council receive] information critical
to bargaining through other facets of the bank's multi-dimensional relation with
the firm .... " Gilson, CorporateGovernance and Economic Efficiency, supranote 1,at

344 n.55.
55 See § 29 11 MitbestG; see also DIETRIcH HOFmANN, DER AuFSlrcmsRAT, 107
1994 [hereinafter HoFmAN, AUFSCHTSRAT] (noting that the chairman has a second vote to settle a tie); Charny, supra note 1, at 159 n.33 ("The chairman, a shareholder representative, casts a decisive vote in case of a tie.'); Gordon Pathaas to
CorporateConvergence?, supra note 1, at 222 ("[ln a direct conflict the chair can be
counted upon to break a tie in favor of the shareholders.").
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over the board. 56 They need not fear employee delegates. They are
in a position, ultimately, to use a powerful supervisory council for
their own purposes.5 7
A response to my present contention may start off by pointing
out that the shareholders' edge is extremely slim. Therefore,
dominant investors will not be able to have their way, inasmuch as
they do not control all of the stock. Moreover, they may face coordination problems. As a result, they may not always be able to act
as cohorts even with respect to the shares they do command.
This reply compels tempering my original argument, but not
abandoning it altogether. Labor faces collective action difficulties
of its own. More significantly, it will never be in a position to win
a vote in the board on its own. It will ineluctably have to recruit at
least one shareholder representative in order to prevail. Hence, the
dominant investors will presumably be able to block any attempt
to hijack the supervisory council for the exclusive benefit of the
employees.
It is possible to try to counter my claim from another angle.
This retort could even include a concession that stockholders do
not fear confrontation with labor on the board. It would exclusively draw on the assertion that investors are reluctant to share information with the workforce's delegates.58 The latter may not
only leak the data thus obtained to harm the corporation, 9 but also
may use it to gain the upper hand in collective bargaining.

56 "Board membership, whether supervisory or unitary, gives labor no formal
power when capital retains ultimate voting control (as is the case in Germany,
where tie-breaking power resides with the supervisory board chairman, who is
chosen by the shareholders)" Gilson, Corporate Governanceand Economic Efficiency,
supra note 1, at 344.
57 See PETER BADURA, PARITATISCHE MITBESTIMMUNG UND VERFASSUNG ZGR
524 (1974); BVerfGE 50, 290; ELMAR GERUM ET AL., DER MITBESTIMMENDE
AUFSICHTSRAT: EINE EMPIRISCHE UNTERSUCHUNG 54 (1988).

5, See Charny, supra note 1, at 158-59 (noting that "codetermination forces
some information sharing with workers" and underscoring the importance "of
board representation in providing information for the functioning of unions and
works [sic] councils'); Gordon Pathways to Corporate Convergence?, supra note 1, at
222 ("The desire to avoid revealing information to employee representatives
means that supervisory board members typically receive much less information
than American public company directors.").
59 Hopt, Gemeinsame Grundsiitze, supra note 4, at 801 (explaining that under
codetermination, "keeping secrets becomes more difficult, which may lead management to hesitate to brief regular members of the supervisory council at an
early stage on sensitive issues").
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This point is crucially relevant; however, one should not overdraw it. Supervisory council members who filter corporate secrets
expose themselves to liability for violating their duty of loyalty to
the company.60 Furthermore, employee delegates would be hurting their own constituency if they gratuitously inflicted damage on
the corporation.
All the same, capital may well be wary of giving workers a negotiation advantage by opening up corporate files to their delegates. Yet, in Germany, labor already possesses a considerable
amount of information about enterprises. Employees are able to
learn a great deal about their companies through a high level of organization and through their legally guaranteed role in the productive decision-making. Moreover and as already noted, the law
now requires management to provide the supervisory council with
considerable key data. Consequently, the main investors are not
likely to believe that they can keep labor in the dark by undermining the overseeing board.
As already noted, key stockholders in Germany have mechanisms of control other than the supervisory council Moreover,
they act principally as creditors who are keen on avoiding risky
strategies. Therefore, they do not have to micromanage the corporation into profit maximizing. They only need general oversight
and veto power in order to preclude excessive risk taking. Thus,
they might be content with general oversight through their informal channels and have no particular need for rigorous board
monitoring.61
However, the supervisory council is actually an ideal body for
broad supervision-much better suited than more casual mechanisms. It is actually not appropriate for second-guessing management. Investors will not be prone to do without the general monitoring body just because of the diffuse benefits they might get from
denying employees access to some corporate data.
60

§§ 93, 116, AktG; see HoFIANN, AUFSICHTSRAT, supra note 55, at 135; UWE

HOFFER, AKrIENGEsm7, at 22, § 93 (1997) [hereinafter HOFFER, AKTJNGEsEu-Z];
Klaus J.Hopt, in 11 GRo2KoMI,NTAR ZUM AKrIENGEsz, at 11, § 93 (1999).
61 See Roe, German Codetermination, supra note 1, at 168 ("Instead of boardroom governance, out-of-the-boardroom shareholder caucuses and meetings between managers and large shareholders substitute for effective boardroom action.'); id. at 174 (specifying informal mechanisms through which capital may
obtain information); id. at 181 ("Large blockholders' representatives meet informally with managers, outside of the formal meetings, and this seems to be Germany's significant monitoring mechanism....).

U. Pa.J. Int'l Econ. L.

[22:4

The upshot is the following. Major shareholders would probably prefer not to share power with labor. Yet, they will most certainly not try to incapacitate the supervisory council. If they did
make such an attempt and succeeded, they would end up hurting
themselves. 62 They would not be able to keep an eye on management, whose interests may diverge significantly from their own.
On the one hand, I have granted that the supervisory council is
not effective enough. On the other hand, I have maintained that it
would be inaccurate to attribute the body's inefficacy entirely to
the intrigues of managers and bankers. What other factors contribute to the deficiency? The rationale is rather complex, but certainly worth reflecting upon.
One might be tempted to argue that, inasmuch as they come
from different cultures, capital and labor representatives inevitably
have trouble working together. From this standpoint, even if all
council members were keen on checking on management, they
would still not be able to cooperate effectively. There is some merit
to this argument, though its form is too extreme. In all corporate
governance regimes, even those in which stockholders appoint the
entire board, overseers have divergent backgrounds. Codetermination simply adds another layer of diversity.
More to the point, all delegates in the German supervisory
council-including those representing labor-tend to develop a
common perspective just by virtue of being on the board together.
The challenge these individuals face-like board members anywhere in the world -is to preserve their different viewpoints and
bring them to bear on their shared purpose.63 The presence of labor representatives -or that of bank appointees, for that matterdoes not ultimately change the nature of this venture. 64
In part, the supervisory council evinces the natural propensity
to passivity of corporate overseers everywhere. Inasmuch as they
do not run the business day in and day out, these individuals will
typically be too ill-informed to contest managerial decision62 See Roe, German Codetermination,supra note 1, at 168 ("[Dliffuse stockholders will at key points in a firm's future need a plausible board (due to a succession
crisis, a production downfall, or a technological challenge) .... .).
63 See ULRicH EISENHARDT, GESELLSCHAFrSRECHT 307 (1994) [hereinafter

EISENHARDT, GESELLSCHAFrSREcHTJ.
64 See, e.g., HOFFMANN, AUFSiCHTSRAT, supra note 55, at 5 (arguing that all

council members should represent the interests of the enterprise as a whole rather
than those of their own group).
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making.65 Further, unlike management, they are not with the corporation on a full-time basis. Hence, they will often not have sufficient time or enough at stake to perform their monitoring role
thoroughly.
Though the problem of corporate overseer's lack of information, time, and motivation to perform their duties appropriately is
universal, it takes a specific form in Germany. Accordingly, the
solution will have to be sensitive to the German context. I will
briefly discuss each of these three deficiencies separately.
I have already mentioned that the 1998 Corporate Control and
Transparency Act improves the flow of information from management to the supervisory council. German lawmakers could go
further in the same direction. They could require that management
provide more detailed information to the supervisory council on a
more timely basis.66 They could also impose a duty on council
members to obtain "independent professional advice." 67 The entire
board would thus benefit from an additional, untainted point of
view. More specifically, the employee delegation would be able to
hire business consultants in order to keep up when the council is
considering complex commercial issues.
Clearly, overseers require not only the relevant data. They
must also have the means to process all the facts. The financial and
the business auditors-as well as the expert advisors just proposed -could certainly help on this front. Yet, it is key to an adequate deliberation environment. For example, a reduction in the
size of the council, 68 or explicit legal encouragement for the formation of committees, would make a significant difference in this regard.
However, downsizing the board is extremely difficult, inasmuch as it would require tampering with the codetermination law.
See THEISEN, UNTERNEHmENsFGHRUNG, supranote 42, at 251.
See Hommelhoff, supra note 44, at 256 ("ITlhe German supervisory council
is not integrated rapidly or intensively enough to the management's flow of information or decision-making process.'; Lutter, Verglidwnde Corporate Governance, supranote 14,at 232 (calling for laws forcing managers to provide the supervisory council with more specific information).
67 Hopt, Gemeinsame Grundsfitze, supra note 4, at 799.
63 See Adams, Bankenmadit und Deutsdw"r Juristentag,supra note 2, at 1599
(stating that corporate governance reform should focus on the supervisory council's size, "which is too large and hinders a reasonable performance"); Lutter, Vergleichende Corporate Governance, supra note 14, at 229 (urging a reduction in the
number of supervisory council members).
65

66
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The statute that, among other things, grants workers a presence
within the corporate structure is the product of an intense political
struggle among extremely powerful groups in German society,
most conspicuously labor unions and employers' associations. 69 It
embodies a painstakingly bargained-for balance of a multiplicity of
competing interests. Consequently, its amendment is extraordinarily difficult. Its most recent minor modifications, for instance,
were controversial within and outside of the government. 70
As already noted, since its enactment in 1952, the Codetermination Act has been significantly revised only once, in 1976. In
fact, the conflict to which that single revision gave rise continued
after the legislative vote and ended up in the Constitutional
Court.7 The tribunal finally upheld the amendments in a contro-

versial split decision.
Klaus J. Hopt reports that, during the debate that led to the enactment of the 1998 Corporate Control and Transparency Act, the
acting Minister of Justice, businessmen, and legal experts unanimously supported reducing the size of the supervisory council. 72
Nonetheless, unions and the Minister of Labor opposed this position. They eventually carried the day and blocked the reform.73
Therefore, the prospects of reducing the total number of supervisory council seats are not promising. Yet, this kind of change is
not indispensable. The aim is to allow an informal and open discussion of key issues affecting the corporation among a relatively
small group of persons. It is possible to attain this kind of focused
and honest deliberation through committees, which ultimately report to the board as a whole.

69 See GUNTHER SCHWERDTFEGER, MITBESTIMMUNG IM PRIVATEN UNTERNEHMEN
117 (1973); Hartmut Oetker, in 12 GRO1BKOMMENTAR ZUM AKTIENGESETZ, at 16

(1999) (Vorbemerkung zum Mitbestimmungsgesetz).
70 Streit um Mitbestimmung spitzt sich zu, SODDEUTSCHEZEITUNG ONLINE (sueddeutsche.de) (Feb. 10, 2001). The changes concerned only workers' councils, not
the supervisory council. See Hintergrund:Eckpunkte zur Reform der Betriebsverfassung, SODDEUTSCHEZEITUNG ONLINE (sueddeutsche.de) (Feb. 10, 2001).
71 BverfGE 50, 290, 323; see also PETER HANAU AND PETER ULMER,
KURZKOMMENTAR ZUM MITBESTIMMUNGSGESETZ, at 24 (Einleitung) (1981) [hereinafter HANAU-ULMER, MITBESIMMUNGSGESETZ]; HANS-JUERGEN PAPIER, DIE
AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT, at 242 (1978); REINHARD RICHARDI, DIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFr,

at 29 (1979); THOMAS RAISER, KOMMENTAR ZUM MITBESrIMMUNGSGESETZ, at 40
(Einleitung) (1987) [hereinafter RAISER, MITBESTIMMUNGSGESETZ].
72 Hopt, Gemeinsame Grundsdtze, supra note 4, at 785.
73 Id.
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The German legislature could thus concentrate on promoting
the formation of committees. The full supervisory council would
have to approve them, and there should be no violation of the representative parity between capital and labor. The law could, specifically, establish that all large public corporations must have certain committees at all times -such as those in charge of auditing or
executive compensation-and others only under certain circumstances -such as those reviewing litigation or mergers.74
The 1998 Corporate Control and Transparency Act also contributes to expanding the amount of time that the board devotes to
the corporation with the already noted increase in the number of
meetings. Pursuant to my previous recommendation, council
members would have to spend additional hours attending committee meetings. The law could even specify a minimum number
of hours that it expects individuals to dedicate to their supervisory

functions. The point would be not to police their use of time, but
rather to communicate the message that they must take their job
seriously. Of course, the corporation would have to increase their
remuneration accordingly.7
One way to provide the supervisory council with incentivesat least of a monetary kind-to monitor corporate decision making
with care would be to offer stock options. German corporations
have traditionally relied on this type of remuneration less than
their U.S. counterparts. 76 Yet, they have been catching up lately.
Significantly, the 1998 Corporate Control and Transparency Act
eliminates prior legal restrictions on executive stock options and
allows option plans as long as shareholders approve."
However, the statute covers only managers on this issue. It
does not do away with the German prohibition on stock options
for supervisory council members. The final elimination of this ban
74 See Lutter, Vergleichende CorporateGovernance,supra note 14, at 229 ("At an),
rate, stock exchanges should require each listed corporation to set up at least 3
committees. . ., including at least an audit committee."); sce also id. at 230; Hommelhoff, supra note 44, at 258 ("lAin audit committee should be set up in all corporations listed in the German stock exchange.").
75 See KfibIer, supra note 43, at N19 (calling for remuneration of supervisory
council members sufficient to enable them to carry out their duties responsibly).
76 HOFFER, AKrIENGESBZ, supra note 60, § 87. Manager compensation is lower
in Germany across the board and not just with respect to stock options. Sce
Gordon Pathways to CorporateConvergence?, supra note 1, at 235 ('Top managers in
Germany are paid considerably less than their US. counterparts.").
77 § 192(1)(3), AktG.
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would constitute a step forward. 78 Favorable tax treatment, similar
to that available in the United States, would further encourage the
use of stock options.
German board members may lack not only the time, but also
the motivation to supervise appropriately because of their frequent
participation in the supervisory councils of various corporations at
the same time. The law allows them to occupy up to ten seats simultaneously. 79 These multiple commitments may give rise to
conflicts of interest.
Board members may sit on the supervisory council of another
company along with an individual who happens to be a manager
whom they should be supervising. Actually, that very individual
may be on the board of overseers of still another corporation for
which they primarily work as managers. This kind of incestuous
networking makes reliable supervision highly improbable.
The German Corporation Act forbids only "direct crossover
intertwining"80 between companies and financial entities. In other
words, "the legal representative of a credit institution" may not sit
on the supervisory council of a corporation that has appointed one
of its managers to that credit institution's supervisory council.8'
Thus, the arrangement depicted in Figure 1 is illegal. However, if
exactly the same overlap takes place between two companies that
are not in the credit business, there is no illegality. Moreover, a
bank may appoint its representatives to as many corporations as it

78 Lutter calls for "the establishment of such options program also for supervisory council members." Lutter, Vergleichende Corporate Governance, supra note
14, at 231. In contrast, Theisen argues against stock options for council members
with the following argument "The supervisory council must carry out its functions independently of corporate performance and therefore must be compensated basically independently, though appropriately." Theisen, CorporateGovernance, infra note 87, at 162. Yet, so long as a third party approves and monitors the
option plan, there should be no impairment of the council's independence.
79 §100 II, No. 1, AktG; see EISENHARDT, GESELLSCHAFrSREcHT, supranote 63, at
283; KLAUS J. HoPr, FESrscHRFr FOR ULRIcH EVERLING, 475, 480 (1995); FRIEDRICH
KOBLER, GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT, 183 (5th ed. 1998) [hereinafter KOBLER,
GESELLSCHAFrSRECHT]; K~hler, supra note 21, at N50; Raiser supra note 21, at 2259.
80 See Peter 0. Mi.lbert, Aktiengesellschaft, Unternehmensgruppe und Kapitalmarkt, at 16 (1995) [hereinafter Mfilbert, Aktiengesellschaft]; see also, ERNST GEBLER,
AKrIENGESETZ KOMMENTAR, at 26, § 100 (1974); HOFFER, AKTIENGESETZ, supra note
60, at 3, §100.
81 AktG §100(I)(3;) see also ANDREAS MEYER-LANDRUT, GROBKOMMENTAR ZUM
AKTIENGESETZ,
at 6, § 100
(1979); THOMAS RAISER, RECHT DER
KAPITALGESEt.ScHAFTEN, at 31, § 15 (1992).
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wants, so long as none of those companies names any of its managers to the bank's supervisory council.
Figure1. Bank Corp.

German law could adapt to deal with these concrete difficulties. It could, for instance, reduce the number of supervisory council seats that a particular individual may occupy at the same time from the current ten to, perhaps, five.P It could also forbid all
kinds of direct, crossover intertwining.
The problem, however, is more institutional, than personal. In
other words, the danger is not just that a particular individual
might run into this kind of conflict of interest, but that an institution-such as a financial intermediary-might For example, a
bank could have one set of its employees sit on a particular company's supervisory council and completely different group serve
on its own council. The bank might thus end up basically sitting
on both ends of the transaction when it comes to negotiating the
terms of a loan to that corporation.
It might be relatively easy to deal with such conspicuous
cases,P3 but considerably more difficult to preclude subtler conflicts
of interest A categorical ban or limitation on the employees of fi82 See Lutter, Macht der Banken, supra note 21, at 2767 ('Thus the recommendation I have been making for a long time: No more than 5 council seats Far Frson!'; Mfilbert, supra note 21, at E119 ("The limit on seats established in 1001 (1)
AktG should be lowered to five in order to guarantee a responsible exercise of the
mandate.'. But cf. Kilbler, supra note 43, at N16 (rejecting a reduction in the
maximum number of seats that a person may hold).
83 These kinds of actions are arguably already illegal. See Miflbert, supra note
21, at E106 (suggesting that bank appointees may not allow the information they
acquire as members of the supervisory council affect their bank decisions with respect to the corporation); Johannes Semler, Referat, in EMPEHLEN SIcH GESETZHE

REGELUNGEN ZUR EINSCHRANKUNG DES EINFLU.SES DER KREDmTIsI TrUE AUF
AKrIENGESELscHAFrEN? N29, N31 (61. Deutschen Juristentag) (1996) (contending

that German corporate law already bans "concrete conflicts of interests).
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nancial institutions would be too extreme and unfair.84 A better
approach would be to rely on transparency. If supervisory council
members had to disclose all their connections,.8 they might be less
tempted to double-deal and, in any case, it would be easier to keep
an eye on them.
Naturally, all of these legislative amendments would not in
themselves solve the general problem of overseers' proclivity to
passiveness, nor the specific loyalty issues that a codetermined and
bank-dominated system ineluctably gives rise to. They would
have to be part of a larger effort to continue specifying the standards not only through statutes, 86 but also through case law, as
well as codes of practice.8 7 Of course, the government and the
courts would have to intensify their (already significant) efforts to
enforce and apply the new criteria. 88 The challenge is to change the
84 Kfibler, supra note 43, at N12 ("[Aibsolute prohibitions on intermingling
and participation are dubious because they hinder economically reasonable cooperation and integration even when there are no competition problems.'); Milibert,
supra note 21, at E119 ("Rules disqualifying bank representatives from becoming
supervisory council members are not advisable.").
85 Various commentators have suggested this approach. See, e.g., Mfilbert,
supra note 21, at E119 (proposing amending German corporate law to compel
council members to disclose directorial positions they hold in other companies);
id., at E118 (advocating amendments to require council members to disclose
whether they occupy leading positions in banks that hold deposited shares of the
corporation); Schneider & Burgard, supra note 21, at 1762 (recommending disclosure of banks' appointments to the council, of their direct shareholdings, and of
their deposited shares).
86 Raiser supra note 21, at 2261 (pleading for a statutory specification of the
duties of care and loyalty).
87 See Tobias 0. Wiese, Verantwortlichkeit des Aufsichtsrats-Aktuelle Entwicklungen im Bereich der CorporateGovernance, 53 DB1901, 1905 (2000) (calling for new
laws, court decisions, and corporate governance codes to define directors' duties).
Theisen documents the recent German revolution in corporate governance codes.
He refers to the year 2000, in which four commissions set out to draft such codes,
as the "Year of Corporate Governance." Manuel Ren6 Theisen, CorporateGovernance: Eine neue Leitkulturfir die Unternehmungsftihrung?,RWZ 157, 159 (2001). He
censures these efforts for their lack of cohesion with each other, as well as for their
blind assimilation of U.S. norms, which are at times incompatible with the German legal and economic reality. Id. at 163-64.
88 See Wiese, supra note 87, at 1902-03 (recommending court liability as a way
to improve corporate monitoring). Of course, it is crucial that judges not go overboard in their scrutiny. They should generally defer to the expertise of council
members and not try to engage in ex post facto second-guessing. Ideally, they
should take a procedural approach when reviewing the actions of council members. That is to say, they should determine whether the board conducted a reasonable investigation-e.g., obtained relevant documents, consulted the appropriate specialist, asked the right questions -prior to adopting its decision.
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motivational structure of board members, 9 as well as to create new
corporate governance culture. 90
Some scholars have submitted that the U.S. corporations have

more efficient internal supervision mechanisms than their German
counterparts.9 ' The argument is that independent directors in the

United States have the expertise and the right incentives to probe
into management's decision making. The irony is that, in the previous dialectical cycle, the main argument was that inner moni-

toring in U.S. corporations was inadequate and that, in contrast,
German corporate overseers, such as financial institutions and em-

ployees, had enough at stake and sufficient resources to watch
carefully how managers were doing their job.92 The assumption

then seemed to be that U.S. management completely dominated
the board and that independent directors had a hopelessly limited
impact

Though now the debate has taken a 180-degree turn, the fact
remains that U.S. independent directors generally do not have the

right incentives or informational resources to make a difference in
the administration of the corporation. They have too much of a
89 See Lutter, Vergleichende CorporateGovernance,supranote 14, at 229 ("All the
necessary tools are already there; the challenge is to put them to use. In fact, what
is at stake is the direction of human behavior as well as the motivation of individuals.")
90 See Theisen, CorporateGovernance, supra note 87, at 165 (stating that individuals involved, as well as those concerned, must come to accept the new standards as "a corporate governance and supervision culture" that is superior to the
status quo).
91 See Gordon, Deutsche Telekom, supra note 1, at 201 ("One possible evolutionary path is for the supervisory board, under pressure from foreign capital investment, to move more in the direction of an American-style board, especially in
the attitude of directors."); Roe, German Codetermination, supra note 1, at 168 (outlining four characteristics that make German boardrooms weaker than their US.
counterparts).
92 See Roe, Some Differences in CorporateStnclures, supranote 2, at 1931-32:
[Tihe competitive advantage of the foreign structure may lie not just in
reducing what we think of as agency costs, but in (1) changing the environment of decisionmaking-bringing more individuals and organizations to the table when technologies and markets are changing too rapidly for a single CEO or a single firm to stay current, (2) improving the
information flow to large stockholders in ways that a fragmented securities market cannot achieve; or (3) improving organizational performance
by facilitating relation-specific investments without using a stultifying,
large vertical organization and by providing a matrix for decisionmaking
across related organizations.
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tendency to defer to management, both because they usually owe it
their appointment and because they are not familiar with the dayto-day operation of the company. Management typically sets the
agenda and runs U.S. board meetings. To be sure, lately U.S.
courts have not only encouraged the designation of independent
directors, but also have called on them to be more active. Yet, the
adduced structural impediments make this kind of engagement
difficult.
By contrast, all German council members are, in principle, independent directors inasmuch as, pursuant to the law, they may
not sit on the managerial board. 3 Moreover, they-or rather their
constituents -normally have a vested interest in the firm and
therefore a good reason to take their job seriously. Nonetheless,
they work in a body that remains, to some extent, institutionally
weak. They also face the motivational impediments previously
cited. The supervisory council will be able to realize its full monitoring potential only through a reconfiguration of its underlying
conditions and an invigoration of its membership. I have already
provided some ideas to this effect.
A worthwhile comparison of the two systems of corporate governance requires much more empirical work. Only this kind of
evidence could confirm or falsify my belief that, overall, both approaches to corporate monitoring are at present more or less
equally deficient. Furthermore, my assertion that a bolstered supervisory council could be an effective control device rests on an
analysis of the body's constitution and inner dynamics, but will
find ultimate proof only after the implementation and a careful examination of the contemplated changes.
It is helpful to keep sight of how corporate monitoring should
ideally function. One has to choose a middle point between extremes. Just as it would be catastrophic if supervision never took
place, it would be highly undesirable if control were ever-present,
to the point of suffocating effective management. 94
A monitoring mechanism that focused on, and dealt adequately with, crises would be useful. It would be more valuable,
93 See Theisen, CorporateGovernance, supra note 87, at 157 ("The German (and
Austrian) separation model, in contrast with the American or Swiss models, allows absolutely no direct overlap in personnel between the direction and the supervision bodies.").
94 See Kilbler, supra note 43, at N15 (stating that the supervisory council
should respect "management's discretion in running the enterprise").
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however, if it went beyond this. It might, for instance, reinforce
long-term planning, while providing a balanced assessment of the
multiplicity of interests at play in corporate activity.
3.2 Reinforcing External Monitoring
This third matter is crucial because the market theoretically
plays a key role in monitoring corporations. On the one hand, sub
par managers face the punishment of a lower share price. Insofar
as their compensation and reputation hinges on that price, they
will take a hit right away. On the other hand, and more significantly, they risk a hostile takeover and eventual replacement. The
logic is that predators buy a sub-optimally run company at a discount and obtain a return on their investment insofar as they are
able to improve management. 95
Inasmuch as takeovers are indeed more difficult and less frequent in Germany than in the United States, they play a less
prominent role in disciplining corporations. "The development of
a market for hostile corporate acquisitions," as Peter 0. Mtilbert
concedes, "has been considerably hindered by the long-term ownership [and control] of shares by banks."96 As already noted, financial intermediaries often join an unholy alliance with management, which makes unfriendly takeovers more difficult Moreover,
even if banks were open to hostile acquisitions, they would presumably demand a control premium, which would have a dissuasive impact on potential bidders.
It is key to bear in mind that hostile acquisitions became common place in the U.S. market only relatively recently. Moreover,
hostile acquisitions are now a more frequent occurrence in Germany than they were a decade ago. Within the next few years, the
German-or, more accurately, European-market may end up significantly dosing the gap with its U.S. counterpart on this front
The 1995 and 1997 "Takeover Codes" render the bidding process in Germany more open and fair.97 They generally require,
95 Adams, Bankenmacht und Deutscer Juristentag, supra note 2, at 1601 (expressing that the threat of hostile takeovers compels managers to "focus on in-

creasing shareholder value when running the corporation"); Kfibler, supra note 43,
at N13 (underscoring the contribution of proxy contests to the disciplining of
managers).
96 Milbert, supra note 21, at E117; see also Semler, supra note 83, at N36 (noting that German capital markets' monitoring potential is not fully developed).
9 See Hopt, Gemeinsame Grundsdtze, supra note 4, at 788.
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among other things, that the target's management remain neutral
when confronted with competing bids.98 They also impose on the
successful bidder the obligation to make a full-price offer to all
shareholders. 99 Nonetheless, corporations are not fully complying
with these voluntary codes. 100 "Therefore, now a takeover law is
generally considered unavoidable." 1°1 Such an enactment will
further facilitate market monitoring through hostile acquisitions.
In order to continue in this direction, German corporate law
could, through the previously proposed measures, make it more
difficult to leave the supervisory council out of the loop. On the
one hand, an effective council-or, even better, a specialized cominttee -could prevent managers from selfishly resisting a reasonable acquisition effort. On the other hand, the body could support
them if it deemed that the transaction would furnish a short-term
gain for the raider, but no long run benefits for the enterprise. In
this way, the German system might keep shortsighted, bust-up operations, which abound in the United States, in check. The judiciary could back up the council in its monitoring of managerial responses to hostile takeover attempts.
Realistically, however, even a revitalized supervisory council
will not be terribly enthusiastic about these unfriendly acquisitions. Members appointed by financial intermediaries will view
these transactions as involving an unsavory, albeit efficient, kind of
risk, as discussed in the next section. The representatives of employees will fear layoffs and a deterioration of working conditions.
Nevertheless, the process of globalization will generally have
the effect of introducing more bidders and methods of improving
production. In other words, the margin between current and potential performance will increase, as will the number of entities
ready to capitalize on this differential. At the same time and as
pointed out in the next section, international competition will force
financiers, as well as workers, to be more open about efficient risk.
Furthermore, the gradual development of a shareholder culture
adduced infra will, as a consequence, enhance the prospects of foreign or domestic companies seeking to acquire a German corpora98 See id. at 790.
99 See id.
100 Adams, Bankenmacht und Deutscher Juristentag,supra note 2, at 1599 (providing that the 1995 Code "was signed by only 250 of the 677 listed corpora-

tions'l.
101 Hopt, Gemeinsame Grundsfitze, supra note 4, at 788.
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tion. Even if they are not able to acquire a controlling block, suit-

ors will have a much stronger hand if they are able to buy a significant number of shares. Under these circumstances, they will
probably end up paying a lower premium to execute the takeover.
In the United States, corporations also tend to resist outside
bids with vehemence. Controlling insiders are equally unwilling
to yield their power. The law has only gradually come to limit
managers' prerogatives in this area. 02 Yet, it has done so almost

exclusively from the standpoint of shareholder value. 03 In contrast, German law might be able to incorporate the perspective of
other constituencies -such as workers and creditors-as it compels
management to be more open about external offers.
3.3. EncouragingEfficient Risk Taking
I would now like to move on to the third feature of German

corporate governance that has run into criticism in the United
States. Financial intermediaries exercise whatever pressure they
can through the council and, especially, through other informal

channels, to minimize even efficient risk. They probably can count
on the support of employee representatives, whose constituents
have a lot at stake in the corporation, on this matter.
It is helpful to approach this issue through a simple example,
very loosely based on the famous footnote of Crddit Lyonnais Bank
of Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Communications Corp., decided by the
Delaware Court of Chancery.104 Suppose a corporation with $50
102 This process culminates in Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (1985). The Delaware Supreme Court held not only that
the board's actions vis-a-vis a takeover attempt are subject to careful judicial scrutiny, but also that defensive mechanisms are illegal when "dissolution of the company becomes inevitable." Id. at 184. "Market forces must be allowed to operate
freely to bring the target's shareholders the best price available for their equity."
Id.
103 See, e.g., id. at 182 ("A board may have regard for various constituencies in
discharging its responsibilities, provided there are rationally related benefits accruing to the stockholders.); id. ("[C]oncem for non-stockholder interests is inappropriate when an auction among active bidders is in progress, and the object no
longer is to protect or maintain the corporate enterprise but to sell it to the highest
bidder.'.
104 Credit Lyonnais Bank of Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Communications
Corp., 17 DEL J. CORP. L 1099,1155 n.55 (Del. Ch. 1991); John C. Coffee, Jr., Court
Has a New Idea on Directors' Duty, NAT'L T.J, Mar. 2,1992, at 18; C. Robert Morris,
Directors'Duties in Nearly Insolvent Corporations:A Comment on Credit Lyonnais, 19
J. CoRP. L. 61 (1993).
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million in assets and $20 million in debt has to choose between two
plans. The first option (A) involves purchasing $50 million worth
of innovative technology, which has the potential of increasing assets fourfold (from $50 to $200 million), but which is equally likely
to bring total assets down to zero.
The second alternative (B) is to invest the $50 million in conventional machinery. Under this scenario the value could increase
or decrease by $10 million. From the enterprise's standpoint Plan
A makes more sense, as illustrated by the expected values in Figure
2. Plan A has an expected value of a $100 million, twice as much as
that of Plan B. In fact, Plan B represents no improvement over the
status quo.
Figure 2. Expected Values for the Corporation
Plan A
Plan B
Prob.(Value)
50% (200)
50% (60)
Prob.(Value)
50% (0)
50% (40)
Expected Value
100
50
This analysis focuses exclusively on the company's perspective.
Debtholders will view the matter differently. For instance, a bank
that has made a $20 million loan to the corporation will regard
Plan B as having a higher expected value: $20 million versus $10
million. It will not find Plan A's potential of quadrupling assets
particularly exciting, since it would only have a $20 million claim
on the full amount. It will be more concerned about the 50%
chance of the company going broke and not being able to return a
single penny of the $20 million owed. Therefore, it will prefer the
alternative plan, which guarantees, under both possible outcomes,
that the corporation will pay back the credit. Of course, it will be
just as happy to maintain the status quo, in which its $20 million
remain safe. Figure 3 depicts the creditor's perspective.
Fiure3. Expected Values for Holder of Debt
Plan A
Prob.(Value)
50% (20)
Prob.(Value)
50% (0)
Expected Value
10

Plan B
50% (20)
50% (20)
20

German banks may, by the same token, favor a cautious and
sub-optimal strategy under similar circumstances. Insofar as they
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are also partly shareholders, however, they would tend to look
upon an efficiently risky plan more favorably than their counterpart in the previous example. In fact, from the stockholders'
standpoint, this kind of business opportunity appears even more
attractive than it does from the corporation's perspective.
Figure 4 depicts the perspective of shareholders. They have to
discount the corporate value by the amount of debt. Of course, the
total amount of assets sets a limit on this deduction. At any rate,
shareholders will view Plan A not as twice as good, but actually as
three times more appealing than Plan B.
Figure4. Expected Values for Stockholders
Plan A
Prob.(Value)
50% (180)
Prob.(Value)
50% (0)
Expected Value
90

Plan B
50% (40)
50% (20)
30

Nonetheless, German financial intermediaries would ultimately discard this kind of investment opportunity if their creditor
interest dearly predominated and the total expected value for them
were lower than that associated with the conservative path. Most
certainly, they would not hesitate to use all the shares they voteand not simply those they own-in order to force their preferences
on the company.1 °5
To be sure, this divergence between the interests of creditors
and those of the corporation emerges principally when insolvency
is looming on the horizon. In other words, debtholders will oppose a strategy that makes sense from the corporate standpoint
only if there is a risk of bankruptcy. They then will favor any other
strategy that guarantees that the company will remain solvent.
Conversely, they will be basically indifferent in cases in which corporate creditworthiness is not at stake. Therefore, they will not
contravene even extremely risky but profitable ventures, so long as
the debt they hold is not in jeopardy.jOs
1'3 See RAISER, KAPrrALGESELISCHAFTEN, supra note 81, at 80, § 16; K0tL.E,
GESELscHAFsRECHT, supra note 79, at 165; Carsten Peter Claussen, Doppelloyalibit,

DME AKrG 59 (1981).
106 See K6hler, supra note 21, at N49 ("Destructive behavior by banks vis-a-vis
other enterprises is improbable if only because the interests of banks and those of
the corporation and its shareholders generally go hand in hand.'); Kabler, supra
note 43, at N20 ("[A]s a rule, all shareholders-banks as well as share deposi-
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This analysis is somewhat misleading. It focuses exclusively on
discrete, one-shot business decisions. A more dynamic, long-term
approach would suggest that creditors might object to efficient risk
even if there were no immediate threat of insolvency. They might
look unfavorably upon any investment with the potential to considerably reduce corporate value. They might view any such plan
as the possible beginning of a pattern that could ultimately drive
the company to bankruptcy. In any case, they would probably disfavor any measure that might bring the corporation too close to insolvency for their comfort.
German financial intermediaries, who hold significant amounts
of long-term debt, may often be in this situation. They may look
down upon an investment that could bring the company to a point
at which its next decision will expose it to bankruptcy. They may
be very aware that they might not be able to dissuade management
from taking the efficient insolvency risk in the ensuing round.
Insofar as these institutions exercise their influence through the
supervisory council, they will be able to recruit labor representatives. The constituency of employees is presumably as bankruptcy-averse as that of creditors. After all, the company inevitably lays off all of its workers when it goes under. However,
employees have a somewhat larger interest in corporate value upswings than creditors do, insofar as their wages often climb as a
consequence. Their delegates will therefore be generally riskaverse, but presumably less so than the financiers' representatives.
The presence of labor on the board has two additional effects.
On the one hand, financial intermediaries are in a position to more
decisively stave off a strategy that might break the enterprise. On
the other hand, they have less fear of investments that might bring
the company to a point at which its next decision could bring about
insolvency; for they will be better able to avert such a risky choice
in the subsequent stage.
To the extent that German credit institutions exercise pressure
mostly outside the supervisory council, labor will not have as
much of an impact on their attitude towards bankruptcy risk.
Therefore, they will probably use all of their indirect influence
against business plans that might in any way take the corporation

tors -are equally interested in the success of the corporation."); Raiser, supra note
21, at 2258 ("[Cqredit institutions have an interest of their own in [the corporation's] health and success.!).
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in the direction of insolvency. In all likelihood, they will end up
opposing some investments that are sensible from the perspective
of the enterprise.
Nevertheless, restrictions on bank direct holdings or on a
bank's ability to set up mutual and other funds are unwarranted. 1°7
They would involve burdensome government regulation and
would ultimately disadvantage German financial institutions with
respect to foreign competitors. As I have already pointed out,
scholars both in the United States and in Germany are virtually
unanimous on this issue. The U.S. experimentation with limitations of this kind was not particularly beneficial and is gradually
coming to an end.
In contrast, it would make sense to limit the extent to which financial intermediaries exert control beyond their ownership rights
through deposited stock and the shares they hold as fund managers. The law could require them to give at least the depositor more
say in how to vote. It could forbid them to act without the explicit
consent of the shareholder.
At present, these institutions must obtain a proxy,10 which is
valid for a maximum of fifteen months. They must additionally
tell the real owner how they intend to cast the ballot,109in case they
receive no specific instructions.1 0 However, if the individual concerned does not direct them to vote one way or another, they may
go ahead and cast the ballot as they declared they would."'
The legislature could simply do away with this vote by default12 It could establish that if the depositor does not express a

107 See Mifibert, supra note 21, at E117-E119 (rejecting drastic changes in German bank's influence mechanisms in corporations); Raiser supra note 21, at 2261
(repudiating a legal separation of the credit and the investment businesses of

banks.). But cf Lutter, Macht der Banken, supra note 21, at 2767 (recommending
limiting bank direct shareholding to 10%/); Adams, Bankenmnadz und Deutscher Juristentag,supra note 2, at 1599 ("In the United States, banks may not participate in
the capital investment business. This regulation should also be introduced in
Germany, if only to strengthen German capital markets.").
103 §135 11, AktG
109 §128 H11, 2, AktG; see Winfried Werner, in 4 GROzKocENTAR ZL..
AKTImNGESETZ, at 29, § 128 (1993) [hereinafter Werner, AK*rIEGESETZ].
110 §128113,4, AktG; see Werner, AKTIEIGESETZ, supranote 109, at41, § 128.
111 §135 V, AktG. See generally, Hopt, Gemeinsane Grundsd1ze, supra note 4, at
804 (explaining how banks vote deposited shares under the law).
112 See Adams, Bankenmacht und Deutsdw'r Juristentag, supra note 2, at 1602
(proposing a ban on voting deposited shares in the absence of instructions); Hopt,
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preference, there may be no further action. Such a measure would
significantly limit the discretion of those who are simply custodians of the shares. The law could also require banks to justify their
vote.113
Another interesting proposal," 4 which the German Social
Democratic Party submitted while in the opposition, would require
banks to appoint an independent third party to decide how to vote
deposited shares." 5 Such a requirement would discourage casting
the votes in question against efficient risk and would increase the
monitoring of the corporation." 6 However, now that the Party is
in power, it seems to have moved this recommendation to the back
burner.
All the same, such restrictions on the ability of financial intermediaries to vote stock under their command would not significantly diminish the weight they carry in the corporation. Presumably, they would be able to obtain a proxy from many a
depositor if they needed to do so. In addition, much of their voting
power is due to direct ownership and would therefore not be affected by either of the discussed measures. Finally, their predominance stems not only from the ballot box, but also from their extensive debt holding.

Gemeinsame Grundsfitze, supra note 4, at 787 (stating that a "simple ban" is one of
the controversial reform proposals).
113 Several authors have expressed support for this option. See Lutter, Macit
der Banken, supra note 21, at 2767; Milbert, supra note 21, at El00, E118; Schneider
& Burgard, supra note 21, at 1765.
114 See Hopt, Gemeinsame Grundsfitze, supra note 4, at 805 (discussing various
failed reform proposals made in the context of the 1998 Corporate Control and
Transparency Act).
I1s SPD-Draft on § 135 Akt-E, BT-Drucks 13/367 January 30,1995), printed in
ZIP 332, 334 (1995); see also Lutter, Macht der Banken, supra note 21, at 2767 (suggesting that shareholder associations cast the vote for deposited shares). But cf
Raiser supra note 21, at 2261 (criticizing voting representative as too expensive);
Semler, supra note 83, at N38 (rejecting proposals to have a third party cast the
vote for deposited shares as unfeasible).
116 Nonetheless, Michael Adams criticizes this proposal "to abolish the right
to vote deposited shares in the absence of instructions and to introduce an voting
agent." Adams, Bankenmacht und Deutscher Juristentag,supra note 2, at 1594. He
underscores "the danger that this representative, for whose integrity there are
fewer guarantees than for that of credit institutions, might become the allpowerful dominator in stockholder meetings." Id. Yet, the underlying problem is
not that banks are dishonest, but rather that they have a conflict of interest. This
difficulty would not apply to an independent agent.
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A resolute supervisory council, as previously contemplated,
might pressure the corporation away from inefficient conservatism_ The employee representatives would only need a minimum
of shareholder support to stand up against management and financial intermediaries. The difficulty, however, is that the labor delegation will often also favor a conservative strategy, particularly
one that preserves jobs or does not require considerable retraining
of workers. Only in exceptional circumstances is an efficiently
risky approach in the employee's best interests.
In an ideal world, employee representatives would generally
look out for workers while keeping in mind the enterprise's needs.
If they deviated too much from this norm, the judiciary would call
them to order. As a rule, they would push for an optimal plan that
harmed the employees the least They would not be extremely risk
averse. Financial shareholderg' delegates would, in turn, also try
to balance in this way the interests of the corporations and those of
creditors.
There is good reason to be somewhat skeptical with respect to
this idealism. A revitalized supervisory council would probably
continue to protect banks excessively -perhaps workers too. The
corporation would nonetheless be able to survive, so long as its
competitors operated within a similar organizational framework.
Nonetheless, as soon as the German enterprise has to match up
against companies that do not face the same constraints, its situation changes dramatically. International competition ineluctably
transforms the choices that financial intermediaries, as well as
workers, face. If these groups are rational, they are going to alter
the way in which they throw their weight around. An inefficiently
conservative strategy, which once might have seemed attractive to
them, would probably appear considerably less so now. In the
past, they might have been able to ward off efficient risk in an environment in which their counterparts acted accordingly. At present, they face severe penalties for this kind of behavior. The corporation's very existence is at stake in a way in which it had not been
in the past At this juncture, the more uncertain but optimal plan
looks more and more appealing. The perspectives of creditors and
shareholders move closer to convergence.
It is possible to illustrate this phenomenon through my previous, simplistic example. International competition shifts the expected outcomes under the conservative strategy. Before, the
company was able to maintain its profit level without much altera-
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tion of its standard operating procedure. Today, if the corporation
simply stays on automatic pilot, it will flounder in the face of foreign competitors, which have already introduced the contemplated
innovations. The company might, under these circumstances, be
able to eke out marginal gains, but only in the best of cases.
Thus, the expected profits are $10 million in the better scenario
and $0 in the worse one. The expected value of Plan B ends up
being lower than that of Plan A. Even a creditor would favor taking that risk. Coincidentally, a similar shift in preferences may
take place on the part of workers too. Notice that if the company
makes absolutely no changes in this new scenario, it will probably
not be able to keep its assets at their current level of $50 million. It
may very well come up completely empty-handed at the end of the
term.
Figure5. Shifted E pected Values for Debtholders.
Plan A
Plan B
Prob.(Value)
50% (20)
50% (10)
Prob.(Value)
50% (0)
50% (0)
Expected Value
10
5
In any case, the corporate influence of German and continental
European banks has already started to wane." 7 Furthermore, as a
shareholder culture develops along the lines traced below, it will
become increasingly difficult for financial intermediaries to control
the corporate agenda. There will be more and more unaffiliated
shareholders, who will object to sub-optimally conservative strategies. These individuals will exert additional pressure on the company to undertake economically sound risks.
3.4. Improving Capitalization
This fourth criticism is somewhat more complicated than its
antecedents. The starting premise is that controlling stockholders,
particularly financial intermediaries, exploit minority shareholders.
I will first examine this assumption.

117 Coffee, The Rise of Dispersed Ownership, supra note 1, at 15 ("Considerable
evidence exists that the traditional system of concentrated ownership is at least
marginally weakening across Europe. Data compiled by the Conference Board

shows a measurable decline in the stakes held in the twenty-five largest corporations by banks and nonfinancial corporations in Germany, France, and Japan.").
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Insofar as a shareholder or group thereof holds a controlling
block of shares, the minority will tend to be at a disadvantage. To
be sure, minority stockholders will have a right to their proportional share of dividends and value growth Yet, when broader
decisions are at stake, the corporation will tend to favor the interests of the majority over those of the minority. In this sense, minority stockholders will generally be worse off in the concentrated
ownership arrangement existing in Germany than they are in the
diffuse system that prevails in the United States.
All the same, it is simply not true that minority shareholders
have fewer substantive rights in Germany than they do in the
United States.118 Both jurisdictions afford these stockholders the
same basic protections. With respect to more specific prerogatives,
sometimes the U.S. legal system is indeed more generous, but at
other times it is less so.
The duty of care and loyalty applies to managers and board
members in both countries." 9 In Germany, it covers controlling
shareholders too, including financial intermediaries. Thus, with
respect to this most fundamental principle, German minority investors have a slight edge over their U.S. counterparts.
On more specific issues, it is difficult to conclude that either of
these legal systems offers better guarantees. First, unlike a small
number of their U.S. counterparts, German stockholders may not

118 Cf. Coffee, Do Norms Matter?, supra note 1, at 2161 (stating that "researchers have regularly criticized German civil law for its lack of minority protec-

tions').
119 See Hopt, Gemeinsame Grundsdtze, supra note 4, at 785.
Directors' duties of conduct are similar, to a great extent In particular,
German law-like its American and English counterparts-has interpreted the duty of care through an evolving business judgment rule.
With respect to the duty of loyalty, which is usually less developed in
Germany, courts and scholars are aware of the problem and are attempting to raise the requirements to meet international standards.
Id. Compare §§ 93, 116, AktG (providing that supervisory council members and
managers have a duty to conduct themselves as prudent and conscientious businessmen), with Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, 634 A.2d 345,367 (1993) ("Duty of care
and duty of loyalty are the traditional hallmarks of a fiduciary who endeavors to
act in the service of a corporation and its stockholders."). But cf. Coffee, Do Norms
Matter?, at 2170 (suggesting that fiduciary duties are stronger in the United States
than on the European Continent); Gordon, Pathways to Corporate Convergence?, supra note 1, at 221-22 ("Germany is classified as a country without a robust tradition of fiduciary duty protection of the interests of minority stockholders.').
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vote cumulatively. 120 Second, both German and U.S. law ban insider trading, 2 ' which represents one way of exploiting minorities.
Third, both systems allow all shareholders, including those who
are in the minority, to enter voting trusts or agreements. 22 Fourth,
minorities have a right to participate in the profits of a sale of control in Germany, but usually not in the United States. Fifth, the
right to inspect corporate documents and to make proposals is
somewhat stronger in the United States than in Germany. 23 Sixth,
German shareholders, in contrast to their U.S. counterparts, may
call an extraordinary stockholder meeting without the board's acquiescence, so long as they hold at least five percent of the
shares. 124
Sixth, the 1998 Corporate Control and Transparency Act outlawed "capped voting, which limits the number of votes that may
be cast by a single shareholder regardless of the number of shares
held." 1' U.S scholars had criticized this device because it served
"to assure voting control in the large banks. Because the cap does
not apply to shares held by the bank as custodian, and because the
bulk of the bank's voting power comes from custodial shares, the
120 In the United States, cumulative voting is mostly optional. "By 1992, only
six states maintained mandatory cumulative voting; forty-four jurisdictions (including the District of Columbia) chose the permissive form; one state (Massachusetts) did not permit cumulative voting. No important corporate law jurisdiction
maintained mandatory cumulative voting." Jeffrey N. Gordon, Institutions as Relational Investors:A New Look at Cumulative Voting, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 124, 145-146
(1994); see Oliver C. Brandel, in 2 GROSKOMMENTAR ZUM AKTIENGESETZ, at 1, § 12

(1992).
121 Compare In the Matter of Cady, Roberts and Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961)
(making SEC Rule 10b-5 applicable to insider trading); 1934 Securities Exchange
Act § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78 p (banning short-swing profits), with Zweites Finanzmarktforderungsgesetz [Second Financial Market Promotion Act], 1994 Bundesgesetzblatt, Teil I [BGBI. I] 1749; Gesetz fiber den Wertpapierhandel [Securities
Trading Act], (July 26,1994) (banning insider trading in German markets).
122 Compare, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 218 (1994), with ALFONs KRAFT,

GESELtsCHAFrSRECHT

344 (2000) ("Agreements in which a shareholder commits

himself to vote in a particular way (voting agreements) are legally valid.").
123 In Germany, the right to obtain information is limited to shareholder
meetings, while in the United States there usually is no such restriction. Compare
§ 121, AktG, with DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220 (1994) (providing right of inspection
upon proper demand and purpose). Moreover, whereas SEC Rule 14a-8 requires
shareholders to have 1% of the shares or a total of $1000 invested to submit proposals, § 122(2), AktG demands 5% ownership in order to submit matters for a
vote at the annual meeting.
124

§ 122(1), AktG.

125

Gilson, CorporateGovernance and Economic Efficiency, supra note 1, at 343.

2001]

BREAKING ON THROUGH TO THE OTHER SIDE

1013

banks voting control is locked in."12- At present, however, there is

no longer a difference between U.S. and German law on this matter.
Even though the comparative picture is blurry with respect to
substantive entitlements, it is less so when it comes to procedural
rights. German minority shareholders are at a dear disadvantage
vis-A-vis their U.S. counterparts when it comes to enforcing their
rights. 27 First of all, there are no derivative suits in Germany3 3
Stockholders may demand a corporate suit for violation of fiduciary duties only if they own a 10% of the shares.12 9 To be sure, the
bulk of the minority claims will be of a direct nature, inasmuch as
the plaintiffs usually contend that that the majority is infringing
upon their individual prerogatives, not upon those of the corporation. Nonetheless, when the majority is also harming the corporation as a whole, the minority stockholders would benefit from the
derivative action.
For instance, a financial institution with a majority interest in a
corporation may fail to assert with vigor a corporate claim against
another company of which it is a 100% owner. Essentially, it
would be transferring value from the minority shareholders to itself. Yet, in Germany these investors would be unable to file a
claim on behalf of the corporation. If anything, they would have to
126 Id.at 343 n.51; see also Cha-ny, supra note 1, at 161 ("Capped voting... can
impede acquisitions by outsiders or increase the rents that insiders garner for a
change in control."); Gilson, Political Ecology, supra note 19, at 183 ("[A] capped
voting scheme functions to assure that no owner/decisionmaker can exist. Control cannot be centralized in anyone. The result, and presumably the goal, is to
assure that control rests with management while shareholders bear the impact of
economic change.'.
Ir See Adams, Bankenmacht und Deutscher Juristentag,supra note 2, at 1596
("In Germany, as opposed to the United States, the litigation option is closed off
by the imposition of unrealizable prerequisites; thus minority shareholders have
in fact no legal protection against deposit banks and the enterprise's management.").
*I' See Raiser supra note 21, at 2260 ('here is no derivative suit under German law.'); Gordon, Deutsche Telekorn, supra note 1, at 201 (stating that German
corporate law does not permit a shareholder derivative suit).
2 § 147, AktG; see Adams, Bankennzacht und Deutscher Juristentag,supra note
2, at 1596 ("The provisions of § 147, which establish the prerequisites for the enforcement of these claims, have de facto precluded the liability of members of the
enterprise's administration."); Gordon, Deutsde Telkkom, supra note 1, at 201 ("Ten
percent is a very high threshold, especially in a large public firm, that could be
lowered.'; Raiser, supra note 21,at 2261 ("This high threshold operates in practice
prohibitively."). The Social Democratic Party, in fact, proposed reducing the
threshold to 5%. ZIP 1995, 331 (339).
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sue directly. In such a case, the defendants would probably move
for dismissal on the grounds that there had been no discrimination
against the plaintiffs, i.e., that the latter had received treatment
equal to that afforded all other stockholders. 130 It would take quite
a creative judge to reject such a motion.
The nonexistence of class actions also handicaps minority
shareholders. 3 ' Each one of these investors may have a legitimate
discrimination claim, but its value may be too low to make individual litigation worthwhile. Therefore, a lawsuit makes economic
sense only if the plaintiffs sue collectively and share trial expenses.
The class action helps them solve the coordination problem. It empowers them not only to litigate as a group, but also to negotiate
with the defendant, inasmuch as it enables them to speak for, and
to bind, all minority stockholders. Because this option does not
exist in Germany, minority stockholders tend not to institute any
actions under these circumstances.
It is additionally significant that German law does not authorize contingency fees. Attorneys may not take an economic interest
in the cases they litigate. Specifically, they may not enter a contract
with their client providing that there will be no charge unless they
prevail in court, in which case they will receive a percentage of the
damages awarded. Therefore, minority shareholders are unable to
hire a lawyer who will assume part of the litigation risk. They
must pay their advocate up front. Undoubtedly, given these conditions, they will often refuse to bring even legitimate lawsuits.
To make matters worse, if they lose their case, minority stockholders have to pay the attorneys' fees of their adversaries. 132
Germany follows what is known in the United States as "the English rule," which establishes that the defeated party in a civil action
must assume the litigation expenses of the prevailing party. 133 This
norm will tend to discourage minority investors unless they have
an airtight case or a deep pocket to finance potentially unsuccessful
130 See § 53a, AktG (requiring equal treatment of all shareholders).
131 See Adams, Bankenmacht und Deutscher Juristentag, supra note 2, at 1596

("The absence of a class action system to enforce shareholder rights is painfully
noticeable.").
132 § 91 11 ZPO; see also KURT HERGET, ZIVILPROZEBORDNUNG, at 2, § 91 (1994).
133 See John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure,52 U. CHI.
L. REV. 823 (1985); JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION:AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYsrEMs OF WESTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 119
(2nd ed. 1985) ("In civil law countries

counsel fees.").

. . .

the loser usually pays the winner's
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litigation. To be sure, minority investors with a solid case will, ceteis paribus,be more likely to sue under the German system than

under that of the United States. Yet, to the extent that minority
shareholders are usually underdogs against a better financed and
more experienced corporation, the German scheme is a disincen-

tive to them.
I will address each of these four procedural issues in turn.
First, Germany should consider introducing derivative litigation," 4
not only to protect minority investors, but also to improve corpo-

rate monitoring generally. German hesitation on this topic is due
to the fear that U.S.-style strike suits might become prevalent.13

Inasmuch as the German system imposes attorneys' fees on the
losing party and bans contingency fees, frivolous shareholder actions on behalf of the corporation will be less likely than in the

United States. The experience with derivative suits in Germany
would probably be more like that of France than that of the United
States.
Even if German procedure were to abandon the loser-pays-all
approach to attorneys' fees, as well as the prohibition against contingency advocacy, there is good reason to suppose that the experience with derivative litigation in Germany would not mirror that

of the United States. German judges have wide powers to guide
and supervise the ongoing process.

36

Accordingly, inasmuch as

134 See Klbler, supra note 43, at N23 (calling for the introduction of derivative
suits in Germany); Raiser supra note 21, at 2261 (recommending following the US.
example in Germany and allowing derivative suits).
13 Id. at N23 (noting that derivative suits are expensive and may serve as a

blackmail mechanism).
136 See §§ 136, 139 ZPO. Rosenberg, Schwab, and Gottwald specify that
judges have not only the authority, but also the duty to direct the process.

The court has a duty to carry forward the procedure lawfully and purposively, to process the legal dispute exhaustively and expeditiously,
and to bring the dispute to an end in the most efficient way. This engagement by the court is called process direction. This is one of the
court's most important tasks, inasmuch as the final judgment on the
goods and the adequacy of the procedure depend on it ....
The process's direction is the court's responsibility by virtue of its office and does
not require the parties' motion or a request Nor can the parties relieve
the court of this duty. The court must dutifully deliberate upon those
decisions placed within its discretion.
VON LEo ROSENBERG FT AL., ZmVLROZEeRECHT

bein, supra note 133, at 823.

435, § 79 (15th ed. 1993); -e Lang-
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they tend to be more "managerial" than their U.S. colleagues, 137
they will be in a better position to watch and punish the abuses of
the derivative lawsuit.
The three other procedural items require more cautious treatment. They each touch upon a broader procedural principle,
which has an effect far beyond corporate law. The treatment of
these questions should, hence, be more circumspect than that of the
unavailability of derivative suits, which impinges exclusively upon
the law of business organizations. It may be that there are reasons
of weight for the German approach from the perspective of civil
procedure and of the numerous other legal areas affected. If that
were the case, it would not make sense to alter the Civil Process
Code simply with an eye on obtaining some benefits in the regulation of corporations.
Nonetheless, there are solid procedural grounds for making a
change, at least with respect to the second and fourth issues. Regarding the second matter, it is crucial to note that class actions
generally enable plaintiffs to assert public values. Accordingly,
German minority shareholders suing as a class would be fighting
for more than their individual prerogatives. They would be
pleading their rights collectively. The class action would also assist
them in pooling their efforts.
The countervailing concern in the United States is usually that
collective suits facilitate frivolous litigation and undermine the
rights of individuals who are not in court. Yet, inasmuch as they
have special powers with respect to class actions, U.S. courts are
able to forestall these potential difficulties. According to U.S. law,
they must: (1) certify that the class meets all the requirements; (2)
watch over the litigation process; and (3) give their consent before
the plaintiff may withdraw or settle the case. 138 They are thus in a
137

Judith Resnik has noted a recent shift in U.S. federal adjudication on this

respect.
Many federal judges have departed from their earlier attitudes; they
have dropped the relatively disinterested pose to adopt a more active,
'managerial' stance. In growing numbers, judges are not only adjudicating the merits of issues presented to them by litigants, but also are
meeting with parties in chambers to encourage settlement of disputes
and to supervise case preparation. Both before and after the trial, judges
are playing a critical role in shaping litigation and influencing results.
Judith Resnik, ManagerialJudges, 96 HARV. L. REv. 376-77 (1982) (citations omitted).
IM See generally FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
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privileged position to catch and throw out baseless lawsuits, as
well as to ensure that there is no violation of the absent class members' rights. Germany could adopt similar safeguards. Furthermore, inasmuch as they regularly have the managerial powers already mentioned, German judges would be better able than their
U.S. counterparts to prevent abuses of the class action suit
Similarly, Germany could move away from the principle that
the losing party must bear all lawyers" expenses. 3 9 This notion
seems to rest on the premise that whoever suffers a defeat in court
is somehow at fault. Such an assumption is problematic. A person
might lose a case due to: (1) an error of the decision maker; (2) the
ultimate rejection of a colorable legal claim; or (3) ineffective assistance of counsel Under any of these scenarios, it is unfair to impose an additional penalty beyond an adverse determination on
the merits. Moreover, insofar as litigants bring legitimate issues
for adjudication, they are doing a service to the legal system and
society as a whole. For this reason, they deserve encouragement,
not punishment.
Of course, the underlying preoccupation is frivolous suits. Yet,
the German response, in this respect, is dearly overdrawn. The
penalty applies to the kind of cases just alluded to, even though
they obviously fall outside the area of concern. A narrowly tailored measure that imposed attorneys' fees only on hopelessly
baseless claims would be sufficient to attain the stated goal. Once
again, actively engaged German judges would be in an ideal position to keep gratuitous litigants in line.
If achieving these across-the-board modifications to German
civil procedure were not feasible, an alternative would be to limit
changes to the area of corporate law or, even further, to claims of
minority shareholders. On the one hand, the procedural code
could allow class actions only when filed by such individuals. On
the other hand, it could ban shifting attorneys' fees in the cases
mentioned earlier. These measures would significantly improve
the prospects of minority investors trying to vindicate their rights.
However, Germany should pause before adopting contingency
fees, which at times are immensely arbitrary. For instance, it seems
unfair to allow an attorney who has not spent much time on a case
to pocket millions of dollars in compensation. Of course, the cli139 See Gordon, Deutsche Telekom, supra note 1, at 201 ("[T]he 'loser pays' rule
could be eliminated altogether.").
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ents must agree to the arrangement in advance. Yet, they usually
sign these contracts with minimal information and with few other
options. In addition, contingency fees lead lawyers to regard a
case too narrowly in terms of its money value and focus too much
on the damage award. This attitude inevitably corrupts some attorney-client relationships and deteriorates the services rendered.
The courts may certainly intervene, but normally do so only when
the misbehavior is most blatant.
A lawyer and client could, instead, enter an agreement establishing that the latter will pay fees that are on the high end, but
nonetheless reasonable, only if there is a money judgment. Naturally, fewer lawyers would be interested in this kind of arrangement than would accept contingency fees. Potential plaintiffs, in
the aggregate, would therefore suffer a loss if this were the only
option available.
To make up for this disadvantage, German law could require
corporations to pay the attorneys' fees of shareholders that raise
legitimate claims in court. The judge could make a determination
at the end of the case on the appropriateness of fee shifting. There
probably should be a presumption in favor of plaintiffs on this issue. Naturally, this idea is applicable not only in Germany, but
also in the United States.
These procedural changes would improve minority shareholders' lot in Germany. They would build on the improvements in
"procedural law (minority rights)" and "sanctions" that have already taken place.140 As a long-term consequence, more individuals would invest in the stock market and generally require less
compensation for the problem of minority exploitation. However,
the amendments would contribute to the development of a shareholder culture only in conjunction with other factors.
One such contributory element would be a conscious government effort to distribute widely the stock of privatized companies.
Jeffrey Gordon has critically studied this development in the context of the privatization of the German public telephone company.141 Curiously, Gordon concludes that cross-border mergers,
140 Hopt, Gemeinsame Grundsdtze, supra note 4, at 785-86 (explaining that the
strengthening of "procedural law (minority rights)" and "sanctions" has increased
the directors' exposure to liability).
141 See Gordon, Deutsche Telekom, supra note 1,at 186 ("[A] major objective of
the [Telekom] offering was to promote a 'shareholding' culture among German
citizens."); id. at 188 ("This paper argues that the Telekom offering does not take
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such as that between Daimler Benz and Chrysler, may uninten-

tionally contribute even more to the creation of a shareholder culture, than governmental privatization operations. 42
Another key component would be the popularization of the

stock market as people become more aware of securities trading,
gain easier hccess through mutual funds and the Internet, and dis-

pose of more funds for retirement and other investments. This
phenomenon is already taking place in Germany, somewhat as it
did years earlier in the United States 43 The German securities

market is growing exponentially,1 44 while ever more companies are
going public.145

Another crucial part of this process is the ever-increasing listing of large German corporations in the U.S. securities market.

These companies are thus seeking access to the U.S. capital market.146 John Coffee observes that they thus become subject to much
of the Securities Exchange Commission's regulation. He advocates
subjecting them to virtually all the rules. 47 In any case, German
the idea of a shareholding culture very far.); Gordon Patlays to Corporate Convergence?, supra note 1 at 238 ("The Deutsche Telekom transaction was literally
about creating a 'shareholder culture'. ... .).
142 Gordon, Pathways to Corporate Convergence?,supra note 1, at 228.
143 See Coffee, The Rise of Dispersed Ownership, supra note 1,at 20 ("[T~he current ownership levels in nations such as Germany probably exceed those in the
United States in the early twentieth century when dispersed ownership first arrived.").
144 See Coffee, The Rise of Dispersed Ownership, supra note 1, at 7 ("[S]ecurities
markets are growing across Europe at an extraordinary rate ... ");Hopt, Gemeinsame Grundsdtze, supra note 4, at 806 ("German stock exchange markets are growing rapidly ....

";

Mfilbert, supra note 21, at E116 ("ITlhe German system is

evolving... towards a stronger reliance capital markets."); see also Gordon Pathways to Corporate Convergence?,supra note 1, at 240 ("In a system previously established on an 'insider governance' model, it may seem a natural evolutionary step
to give institutional investors a place at the bargaining table to argue for shareholder value."); Grundmann & Milbert, supra note 42, at 223 (noting the "increased significance of institutional investors").
145 See Coffee, The Rise of Dispersed Ownership, supra note 1, at 7
("[E]ntrepreneurs in civil-law countries are making use of IFOs at a rate equivalent to that in the common-law world....).
146 Gilson, Political Ecology, supra note 19, at 183 (informing that the development of international capital markets has provided an alternative source of funds
with a resulting decrease in the percentage of the capital of large German corporations provided by bank credits and loans-from 16.9% in 1974 to 6.6% in 1984);
Hopt, Gemeinsame Grundsdtze, supranote 4, at 793 (noting "the attractiveness of the
U.S. capital markets and the increased access to them [by German companies]
through the New York Stock Exchange").
147 See Coffee, The Futureas History,supra note 1, at 683.

1020

U. Pa.J. Int'l Econ. L.

[22:4

corporations trading in the United States would have to operate
more transparently, following strict U.S. disclosure and accounting
requirements.148 Individual investors-not only in the United
States, but also in Germany-would be in a better position to trade
in German securities. Their information gap vis-A-vis the imposing
financial intermediaries, as well as their susceptibility to exploitation would diminish considerably. Of course, this development
would be basically an extension of the process already set in motion by the 1998 Corporate Control and Transparency Act.
In the end, the German securities market will come under pressure to adopt rules to increase the transparency of listed corporations. In addition to introducing measures to this effect on their
own, the stock exchanges could lobby the government to tighten
securities laws. The German authorities could become more vigilant in this area.
The increasing dispersion in ownership patterns in Germany
will ineluctably reduce the influence of financial intermediaries.149
These institutions will be less able to conspire with management in
undercutting the supervisory council, to thwart any hostile takeover attempt, to force an inefficient conservative agenda on the
corporation, or to take advantage of minority investors. German
companies will generally have wider access to capital at a lower
rate and, hence, position themselves to engage in venture capitalism.5 0 It will become even easier for new companies to start up a
novel idea and then go public.' 5 ' New investors will no longer
have to charge extra for their capital to make up for the anticipated
148 The 1998 Act to Facilitate Capitalization allows German corporations to
follow International Accounting Standards instead of traditional German criteria.
Gesetz zur Verbesserung der Wettbewerbsfihigkeit deutscher Konzerne an internationalen Kapitalmlirkten undzur Erleichterung der Aufnahme von Gesellschafterdarlehen (Kapitalaufnahmeerleichterungsgesetz) [KapAEGI, v. 20.4.1998
(BGBI. I S.707).
149 See Grundmann & Miilbert, supra note 42, at 222-23 ("The increased role of
the stock market in financing enterprises and the related decreasing influence of
large controlling shareholders in listed enterprises have rendered the market a
prominent corporate governance factor in countries such as Germany.").
150 See Hopt, Gemeinsame Grundsdtze, supra note 4, at 807 ("The shift towards
capitalization through stock exchanges is well under way and undermines the dichotomy between jurisdictions or systems that rely on banks and those that rely
on capital markets.").
151 See Coffee, The Rise of Dispersed Ownership, supra note 1, at 18 ("In 1999,
Germany saw 168 IPOs, and France saw 75. For the decade, France led with 581
IPOs, Germany followed with 380, and Spain was a close third with 355.").

2001]

BREAKING ON THROUGH TO THE OTHER SIDE

1021

exploitation of the minority by the majority. Moreover, business
families will more readily sell much of their interest broadly in the
market. The reason is that, generally, the premium charged by
those who sell their control of the company will no longer include
an implicit fee for the benefit of being able to take advantage of the
minority.
4.

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

The adjustments mentioned in the previous section are preferable to drastic changes that would bring German corporate law
very close to that of the United States. First, moving from a double- to a single-tier structure and eliminating the employee delegations would not be advisable. Having a body that is separate from
and independent of management is key to preventing managers
from overreaching. The U.S. system has recognized this point and
has been increasingly encouraging the use of disinterested directors. In many large U.S. corporations, independent board members now outnumber their interested colleagues. What Germany
must actually do-or, rather, continue to do-is make the supervisory council stronger and even more autonomous.
Codetermination is a fundamental part of the German social
contracL. 5 2 It probably will, and certainly should, remain in place.
It facilitates consideration of workers' concerns, which may be at
odds with those of managers and shareholders. 1 3 In particular, it
enables the employees to have a say in, though not a veto right
over,'5 4 decisions that might be profitable in the short term, but extremely burdensome on the workforce. Workers may bargain collectively for protection. Yet, if they have representation on a robust supervisory council, they will obtain crucial information to
defend their contractual interests, and they will be able to react
when unexpected circumstances emerge.
Closing the informational gap between labor and management
along these lines is not only fair and advantageous to employees.
It may also facilitate reaching a collective bargaining agreement
See Hopt, Gemeinsame Grundsftze, supra note 4, at 817 (demonstrating that
odetermination rests on "special and fundamental political decisions").
153 See id. at 801 (providing that codetermination makes possible "a better integration and motivation of employees, as well as a better and faster execution of
152

decisions").
154 See Charny,supra note 1, at 159 (explaining that "workers are not in a position to block any decisions").
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when there is a need for a mode-of-production alteration that requires huge sacrifices by workers. "Game theory literature demonstrates," according to Ronald Gilson, "that the players in bargaining games with asymmetric information often fail to reach a
resolution even though gains from trade are available. However,
when information concerning the subject of the bargain is symmetric, the likelihood of success increases dramatically."' 55
Similarly, it would be unsound for Germany to try to imitate
the United States in restricting, by law, the influence of financial
intermediaries within the corporation. As noted earlier, the United
States is now in the process of discarding the legal limitations saddled on banks and other financial institutions. Germany should
simply adopt measures to limit overreaching. It should also continue updating its securities norms in order to enable ordinary
shareholders to be an effective counterweight. Furthermore, once
the supervisory council returns to the center of decision making,
labor will be in a position to play a similar role. The ultimate objective should be to create an environment in which credit entities
do not cause or contribute to the previously analyzed problems,
but rather provide crucial supervision and counseling to the corporation. 56
Consequently, the preservation of codetermination and the
universal bank system should not be an act of resignation. These
institutions are not simply inalienable cultural legacies. They may
also contribute enormously to a flourishing corporate governance
regime. The aim of the proposed reforms is not damage control,
but rather the realization of a somewhat neglected potential.
It is a mistake to regard German corporate governance as hindering economic growth. Naturally it is tempting to go from the
assertion that structure affects performance, to the observation the
European corporations are doing worse than their U.S. rivals, and
finally to the conclusion that European corporate organization is
worse than that of the United States. Yet, unlike Oscar Wilde, one
should be capable of resisting temptation.
Structure undoubtedly bears upon performance, but in a complex way. Obviously, other factors -such as technology, human
capital, or the government's macroeconomic policies -also play a
SS Gilson, CorporateGovernanceand Economic Efficiency, supra note 1, at 344.
156 See Hopt, Gemeinsame Grundsiitze,supra note 4, at 797 (stating that financial
intermediaries may improve the information available, provide advice, and protect the different stakeholders from each other).
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critical role. A set of similarly structured companies may do worse
than a different group due to these factors. The existing research
has simply failed to establish that it is the corporate governance regime that is hindering continental European companies economically.
More importantly, though economies on the European continent have been relatively sluggish lately, many local corporations
have been competing quite effectively at the international level,
even against U.S. adversaries. In any case, comparative law should
not seek to determine whether a particular system is better than
others. This kind of determination is especially wrongheaded
when the criterion of comparison is an extremely narrow one, such
as corporate output.
First of all, corporate law has numerous underlying objectives.157 It seeks to facilitate business activity, but also to prevent
violations of other legal principles -sometimes even at the expense
of efficiency. For example, the directors typically have no corporate authority or violate their corporate duty when they approve
bribing state officials, no matter how profitable such an action may
be.15s
Furthermore, there is a reflexive as well as an instrumental dimension in corporate law. In other words, corporate rules do not
merely advance pre-established objectives, but actually create an
independent reality, which one should also examine internally and
in terms of ends that it generates on its own. For instance, the
norms configure a space within which various actors, such as managers, shareholders, employees, creditors, and suppliers interact.
One should evaluate this configuration on the basis of not just extrinsic goals, such as economic performance, but also the fairness
of the engendered interrelationships. Fairness or justice is not
simply one purpose among many that legal arrangements serve,
but rather a principle that purports to structure these institutions
immanently. In other words, one does not assess them from the
outside and independently of their internal constitution to determine whether they have yielded an end product called justice. Instead, one has to view them from the perspective of an insider, fo157 See Charny, supra note 1, at 146 ("[Corporate governance systems serve
diverse and potentially conflicting functions... ").
153 See generally Miller v. American Telephone &Telegraph Co., 507 F. 2d 759

(1974) ("[E]ven though committed to the benefit of the corporation, illegal acts
").
may amount to a breach of fiduciary duty. ...
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cusing on their inner workings, in order to ascertain whether they
are just.
When addressing the instrumental and reflexive deficiencies of
a corporate governance system, it may be helpful to seek ideas for
reform in other jurisdictions. Yet, it is key to consider how that
system hangs together and how it fits in with the rest of the legal
order. The point of this kind of reflection is, first, to understand
the full implication of proposed changes and, second, to try to preserve as much as possible the integrity of the broader legal culture.
For instance, labor law and corporate law are intrinsically intertwined in Germany. Hence, it would be a disaster to alter aspects of corporate governance, such as employee representation,
without considering the effect on labor law. One would risk neglecting unforeseen consequences as well as rendering the entire
legal system seriously incoherent. By the same token, it would
have been irresponsible to suggest altering shareholders' procedural rights without taking into account the way in which German
procedure operates generally.
Another illustration of my point may draw on Olivier Pastr6's
ascertainment that in France, "the law is virtually non-existent",
whereas "in the United States, the law is omnipresent." 159 I believe
he means that the French system does not seek to establish statutory and judicial rules to regulate thoroughly the way in which individuals and entities interact. Other civil law jurisdictions fall
into this generalization. They establish general principles and expect the parties to work out with each other the details as well as to
solve any problems that might emerge. Thus, when reforming the
relationships within the corporate administrative structure, one
should be cautious about requiring too much statutory regulation
and judicial interpretation.
This caveat regarding externally inspired alterations of legal institutions is particularly relevant in the context of European integration. As part of the economic integration process, there has
been an attempt to harmonize corporate governance regimes.160 In
159 Olivier Pastr6, Corporate Governance: The End of "'Excdption Frangaise?,"
1998 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 79, 81 (1998).
160 See Coffee, The Rise of Dispersed Ownership, supra note 1, at 14 ("Rather than
individual states modifying their own individual statutes, law reform within the
European Community has proceeded largely on the basis of efforts at harmonization'); Grundmann & Miilbert, supra note 42, at 217 (stating that the European
Community Commission on Implementing a Framework for a Financial Market
considers "national differences in the area of corporate structure a possible legal
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light of the radical differences within the European Union,161 this
undertaking is extremely complicatedj 62 Of course, the main
challenge is the dichotomy between the civil law and the common
law monitoring regimes, "i.e., the supervisory council of the twotier German corporate structure and the board of directors with
outside directors of the single tier Anglo-Saxon system."163
In any case, when imposing European legal institutions on a
particular country, it is crucial to consider the inner logic and the
spirit of domestic law. In fact, European legal integration would
work most appealingly with an approach that went from the bottom up, not with a top-down model. In other words, one would
start from within the national legal order and ponder what kind of
European norms might best contribute to the development of that
order.
I will close with a final example of how continental European
legal culture differs from that of the United States. Didier J.Cherpitel makes the following statement:
[Tihe French consider that a director does not act in the
name of the interests he represents but in the name of the
company on whose Board he sits, the word company being
or factual impediment to the development of a unitary financial market in the
European Union"); Hommelhoff, supra note 44, at 262 ("[A] unified set of organizational principles for all listed corporations in the European Union looms in the
horizon as an attainable goal.).
161 See Grundmann & Mfilbert, supra note 42, at 218 (asserting that differences
in corporate governance within the European Union are far greater than within
the United States).
162 See Grundmann & Mfilbert, supra note 42,at 218 ("Even the framework for
an European discussion on corporate governance is difficult because of the diversity of fundamental positions.'); see also Hopt, Geninsanme Gnidsftze, supra note
4, at 810 ("In the harmonization of corporate law, the European Commission has
long run into political and other difficulties.").
163 See Grundmann & Mfilbert, supra note 42,at 221; see also id. at 222 (discussing that harmonization attempts have failed due to the "fundamentally different positions among the European states with respect to the 'best! structure for
the board and, similarly, with respect to employee codetermination within the
enterprise'); Coffee, The Rise of DispersedOwnership, supra note 1, at 14 (providing
that, in the European harmonization movement, "the old battles over codetermination and workers' rights continue"); Hopt, GereinsameGnundsfitze, supra note 4,
at 810 (stating that important harmonization plans "have been delayed, some of
them for decades, because the member states have not been able to agree on fundamental points. In particular, Germany has not been willing to make compromises in the area of codetermination.').
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used in its widest sense to represent not only the shareholders but also employees, clients, suppliers, etc. 164
Once again, it is possible to extend the assertion to other civil
law jurisdictions. With respect to Germany, for instance, Klaus J.
Hopt declares the following: "[tihe clearly predominant traditional
view assumes that the goals of the corporation encompass the interests of shareholders ...as well as those of creditors... and of

employees, as a special group of creditors."' 65
Therefore, continental European systems should be careful
when adopting U.S. legal devices, which might rest on the premise
that the corporation exclusively represents the interests of equity
holders.
This point of contrast signals the way to a discussion about improving U.S. corporate law. Of course, it would be an error to
blindly import into the United States concepts from civil law jurisdictions. The challenge is, instead, to find inspiration in continental European law in order to transform U.S. corporate governance
on its own terms.
For instance, U.S. law already contains -albeit in a fragmentary
state -the notion that the corporation has responsibilities beyond
maximizing shareholder value. The judicial precedents have endorsed the idea of corporate social accountability;166 the so-called
"constituency statutes" recognize director duties to stakeholders
such as employees, creditors, and the community;167 and securities
164 Id. at 80 (quoting Didier J. Cherpitel, Les ddfis du rapport Vi~not, BANQUE
STRATtGIE, Oct. 1995, at 2).
165 Hopt, Gemeinsame Grundsdtze, supra note 4, at 799; see also Gordon Path-

ways to Corporate Convergence?, supra note 1, at 224 ("The German corporate governance system is famed for its concern for stakeholder interests, particularly employees."). But cf.Grundmann & Millbert, supra note 42,at 220-21 ("[The] legal
mandated consideration of stakeholder interests has been neglected in fact.").
166 See, e.g., A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 13 NJ. 145 (1953) (holding that a
business corporation's contribution of funds for general maintenance of a privately supported educational institution was not an ultra vires act). See generally,
PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY IN A CHANGING SOCIETY 1-53
(1972); PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 2.01, A.L.I. (1994) ("Even if corporate profit and shareholder gain are not thereby enhanced, the corporation, in
the conduct of its business: (3) May devote a reasonable amount of resources to
public welfare, humanitarian, educational and philanthropic purposes.").
167 See, e.g., N.Y. JURISPRUDENCE 2D § 684 (1996) ("Duty to Creditors: The position of a director is one of trust in which he also owes an active duty of faithful
conduct to the corporate creditors."); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-756(d) (1997)
("[A] director of corporation.., shall consider ...(3) the interest of the corpora-
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regulations empower individual shareholders to raise issues of social concern related to the corporation's business. 163 The United
States may derive insights from the civil law experience on how to
integrate the interests of all these stakeholders as well as how to
square the corporation's commercial mission with its communal
obligations. Ultimately the continental European principle that
rights carry obligations with them-which informs not only corporate but also constitutional law and other fields-may be a source
of enlightenment in the United States.
I have delved into the U.S. debate about German and continental European corporate law in order to expose some frequent
misconceptions and to propose a certain reexamination. In this age
of internationalization, comparative law is crucial. Legal systems
constantly come in contact. They must learn about and from each
other. They must cooperate and grow together, while they preserve their distinctness and coherence.
Europeans are right to underscore that globalization should not
translate into "U.S.-Americanization." This kind of reduction is
equally inappropriate in comparative law. By the same token,
when the international outlook changes, and European economies
start outpacing their U.S. counterpart, legal theorists should avoid
the opposite mistake. U.S. scholars should not, at that point, desperately seek ways to copy European models. In the end, the law
must be able, through the efforts of its practitioners and theoreticians, to make its own the words of Don Quixote de la Mancha: "I
know who I am and I know what I can be."169

tion's employees, customers, creditors and suppliers!). Cf. Co.cmimtT ON
CORPORATE LAWS, Other Constituencies Statutes: PotentialforConfision, 45 Bus. LAW.
2253 (1990) (discussing whether state provisions allowing directors to take into
account the interests of other constituencies should be included in the Revised
Model Business Corporation Act).
163 SEC Rule 14a-8, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (1998); see Med. Comm. for Human
Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
169 MIGUEL DE CERVANTES, EL INGENIOSO HIDALGO DON QULXOTE DE LA
MANCHA 35 (lra Parte, Cap. 5) (1940).
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